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UNITED STATES v. SALIM. A HARBINGER FOR
FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS USING
DEPOSITIONS TAKEN ABROAD
Criminal suspects enjoy an array of protections under United States
law that make evidence gathering for any federal prosecution a pains-
taking task.' When inculpatory evidence is located in foreign countries,
however, the obstacles to acquiring it grow numerous and complex.2
These difficulties notwithstanding, an ever-increasing number3 and
1. These protections include the constitutional rights afforded criminal suspects under
the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments, including the rights to be free from warrantless
searches and seizures, to protection against government overreaching during interrogation, to
due process, to privilege against self-incrimination, to a speedy and public jury trial, and to
adequate confrontation of and compulsory process for witnesses. See Saltzburg, The Reach of
the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741, 742-45,
743 nn.9-10 (1980), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING
UNITED STATES'LAw IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 107, 108-12, 109 nn.9-10 (R. Lillich ed.
1981). These protections also include the statutory rights conferred by the authentication re-
quirements of rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the requirements of the hearsay
exceptions and exclusions of rules 801, 803 and 804. See H.R. REP. No. 907, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3578, 3579 [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 907].
2. See H.R. REP. No. 907, supra note 1, at 1-4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3578-80, accompanying amendments under the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984,,Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). The amendments, presented under
H.R. 5919, made foreign-kept business records more readily admissible into evidence in crimi-
nal trials in United States courts, and extended statutes of limitations and Speedy Trial Act
deadlines when evidence in foreign countries must be obtained. The amendments stemmed
from the multiple difficulties involved in securing and obtaining the admission of foreign-based
evidence at trial. Id.; see also III(a) UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-13.500 to 9-
13.516 (1988). The manual advises that:
An alien (Le., American) investigator or prosecutor who attempts to encroach on
[the foreign police] function by investigating a crime or gathering evidence within
another country's borders may be considered to violate its sovereignty. A telephone
call, a letter, or an unauthorized visit to a witness overseas may fall within this stric-
ture. Such violations can generate diplomatic protests and result in denial of access
to the evidence or even the arrest of the agent or Assistant U.S. Attorney who plies
his or her trade overseas.
Id at § 9-13.510.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 907, supra note 1, at 2-4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3578-80; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Particularly in the past decade, our Government has sought, suc-
cessfully, to hold foreign nationals criminally liable under federal laws for conduct committed
entirely beyond the territorial limits of the United States that nevertheless has effects in this
country."). Id. at 1068.
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variety4 of federal prosecutions now require evidence from abroad. This
trend is nearly certain to continue, since the Justice Department sees inter-
national law enforcement as the preeminent development of the past decade
and the top priority for coming years.5
Obtaining oral evidence from witnesses located abroad is particularly
problematic.6 Foreign nationals are not subject to subpoena beyond United
States borders.7 United States citizens and residents are subject to subpoena
4. See statement of Attorney General Dick Thornburgh: "Often, more than 50 percent
of my day is devoted to some matter relating to our international involvement in fighting drug
trafficking, money laundering, international organized crime and business fraud, environmen-
tal depredations, terrorism or espionage." Address by Attorney General Dick Thornburgh,
American Bar Association annual meeting (Aug. 8, 1989), quoted in Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1989,
at A19, col. 1; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1068-69 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (observing that United States criminal laws governing drugs, antitrust, securities
and "a host of other federal criminal statutes" now apply to the actions of foreign nationals
abroad).
5. Attorney General Thornburgh, who previously served in the Justice Department as
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division during the Gerald Ford administration,
stated that upon his return to the Justice Department, the biggest change he perceived was the
"vast increase in the amount of international activity in which we are now engaged." Wash.
Post, supra note 4, at A19, col. 1. Thornburgh said he was pressing Congress for additional
support to "ensure that international matters are given the priority attention they deserve."
Id
6. In nearly all countries, witness depositions in criminal matters must normally be
sought under the letter rogatory provisions of rule 28(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. See III(a) UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-13.500, 13.510, 13.521-22,
13.535 (1988). The requested nation is under no obligation to fulfill such a request, though
many nations comply, at least in part, as a matter of comity. See id. at 9-13.535.
At present, the United States has bilateral "mutual assistance" treaties with Canada, the
Cayman Islands, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Turkey, the terms of which compel
compliance with requests for evidentiary assistance within strictly defined terms. See United
States-United Kingdom Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters with Respect to the
Cayman Islands, with Understandings, July 3, 1986, S. TREATY Doc. 8, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 536 (entered into force Mar. 19, 1990); Treaty Between the
United States and Canada on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, S.
TREATY Doc. 14, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1092 (entered into force
Jan. 24, 1990); Treaty Between the United States and the Italian Republic on Mutual Assist-
ance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9, 1982, S. EXEC. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)
(entered into force Nov. 13, 1985); Treaty Between the United States and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, June 12, 1981, T.I.A.S. No. 10,734 (entered into force Sep. 15, 1983); Treaty
Between the United States and the Republic of Turkey on Extradition and Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 311, T.I.A.S. No. 9891 (entered into force Jan. 1,
1981); Treaty Between the United States and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into force Jan.
23, 1977).
Recently, the United States Senate ratified mutual assistance treaties with four more nations:
the Bahamas, Belgium, Mexico, and Thailand. See 135 CONG. REc. S13,887 (daily ed. Oct.
24, 1989). These treaties will enter into force up6n an exchange of instruments of ratification
by representatives of the United States and these nations.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (1988) (entitled "Subpoena of person in foreign country").
[Vol. 39:895
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abroad, and federal courts may hold them in contempt and impose levies on
their American property for failure to appear.' While a cooperative foreign
court may, at its discretion, compel both United States and foreign nationals
to appear before it at an American court's behest,9 virtually no foreign court
will force a witness of any nationality to come to America to testify at trial.10
Therefore, as the number of transnational prosecutions increases, the refusal
or inability of inculpatory witnesses to come to the United States will place
increasing pressure on federal prosecutors to obtain testimony by depositions
taken abroad."
The taking and use of depositions in federal criminal cases is governed by
rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 Rule 15 grants both
8. Id; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1784 (1988) (governing contempt sanctions).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 907, supra note 1, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3579.
10. See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3579-80; see also
United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1986) (civilized countries do not turn over
their nationals to foreign powers without a treaty); Merino v. United States Marshal, 326 F.2d
5, 13 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997 (1964) (attendance of witnesses in foreign
countries not compellable by American subpoenas).
11. See United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 946 (2d Cir. 1988) (the court begins its
opinion with the observation that "[i]n order to obtain evidence for use in domestic trials,
litigants are apt to find it increasingly necessary to conduct depositions in foreign countries.").
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15. Rule 15 states in part:
(a) When Taken. Whenever due to exceptional circumstances of the case it is in the
interest of justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and
preserved for use at trial, the court may upon motion of such party and notice to the
parties order that testimony of such witness be taken by deposition and that any
designated book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material not privi-
leged, be produced at the same time and place.... After the deposition has been
subscribed the court may discharge the witness.
(b) Notice of Taking. The party at whose instance a deposition is to be taken shall
give to every party reasonable written notice of the time and place for taking the
deposition.... The officer having custody of a defendant shall be notified of the time
and place set for the examination and shall, unless the defendant waives in writing
the right to be present, produce the defendant at the examination and keep the de-
fendant in the presence of the witness during the examination, unless, after being
warned by the court that disruptive conduct will cause the defendant's removal from
the place of the taking of the deposition, the defendant persists in conduct which is
such as to justify exclusion from that place. A defendant not in custody shall have
the right to be present at the examination upon request subject to such terms as may
be fixed by the court, but a failure, absent good cause shown, to appear after notice
and tender of expenses in accordance with subdivision (c) of this rule shall constitute
a waiver of that right and of any objection to the taking and use of the deposition
based upon that right.
(c) Payment of Expenses. Whenever a deposition is taken at the instance of the gov-
ernment, or whenever a deposition is taken at the instance of a defendant who is
unable to bear the expenses of the taking of the deposition, the court may direct that
the expense of travel and subsistence of the defendant and the defendant's attorney
1990]
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federal prosecutors and defendants the power to take depositions from their
own witnesses for use as substantive evidence at criminal trials.13 While de-
fendants traditionally have enjoyed this power under federal statute and
common law, prosecutors have had this power only since 1975 when Con-
gress amended rule 15.4
Rule 15 permits the parties to take a deposition only upon court order."s
By including the court order requirement in rule 15, Congress precluded the
rule's use as a discovery tool. 6 The party seeking the court order must
show "exceptional circumstances" warranting the deposition, usually by
demonstrating the prospective deponent's importance to the case and the
likelihood of the deponent's unavailability at trial. 7 Showing probable un-
for attendance at the examination and the cost of the transcript of the deposition
shall be paid by the government.
(d) How Taken. Subject to such additional conditions as the court shall provide, a
deposition shall be taken and filed in the manner provided in civil actions except as
otherwise provided in these rules, provided that (1) in no event shall a deposition be
taken of a party defendant without that defendant's consent, and (2) the scope and
manner of examination and cross-examination shall be such as would be allowed in
the trial itself. The government shall make available to the defendant or the defend-
ant's counsel for examination and use at the taking of the deposition any statement of
the witness being deposed which is in the possession of the government and to which
the defendant would be entitled at the trial.
(e) Use. At the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition, so far as
otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used as substantive evidence
if the witness is unavailable, as unavailability is defined in Rule 804(a) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, or the witness gives testimony at the trial or hearing inconsistent
with that witness' deposition. Any deposition may also be used by any party for the
purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness.
13. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Notes of Advisory Committee on
Rules, Note to Subdivision (a), and Note on 1974 Amendment).
14. See id. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 was amended by Pub. L. No. 94-64, §§ 3(15)-(19), 89
Stat. 373-74 (1975); see also infra note 54.
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Notes
of Advisory Committee on Rules, Note to Subdivision (a), and Note on 1974 Amendment).
16. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Note on 1974 Amendment).
17. See id. (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Note to Subdivision (a), and Note on
1974 Amendment); see also United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 1988).
Rule 15(a) provides that depositions may be ordered by the court in "exceptional circum-
stances... in the interest of justice." The advisory committee's notes on the rule state that
important to determining these circumstances is "the presence or absence of factors which
determine the use of a deposition at the trial, such as the agreement of the parties to use of the
deposition; the possible unavailability of the witness; or the possibility that coercion may be
used upon the witness .... " FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Note on 1974
Amendment)(emphasis added). The advisory notes later state, apparently with undue narrow-
ness, that a rule 15 deposition "may only be used at trial if the witness is unavailable, and the
rule narrowly defines unavailability." Id. (Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Re-
port No. 94-247)(emphasis added); see also infra note 46.
One commentator has noted that "[u]nder the former (pre-amendment) rule a showing that
the prospective witness may be unable to attend the trial was mandatory before a deposition
1990] United States v. Salim
availability is generally a simple task in transnational cases because of the
dearth of powers that American courts possess to compel witnesses who are
located abroad to appear at trials in the United States."8 Prosecutors in
transnational cases face a far more difficult task complying with rule 15's
"presence" requirement, which mandates that prosecutors present the de-
fendant at the deposition if the defendant is in custody awaiting trial.19 This
provision presents a quandary for prosecutors because the United States cur-
rently has agreements with only six countries to hold American defendants
in custody abroad for purposes of such proceedings.2'
Once a rule 15 deposition is taken, rule 15 limits its use at trial by requir-
ing that the testimony, however recorded, be otherwise admissible under the
narrow hearsay exceptions of the federal evidence rules.2 1 Implicitly, when
the government proffers a rule 15 deposition, the testimony must also pass
muster under the sixth amendment of the Constitution to be admitted
against the defendant at trial.
22
Rule 15 does not distinguish between depositions taken abroad and those
conducted in the United States. Rather, the rule generally prescribes that
depositions should be obtained under the rules used in federal civil litiga-
tion,2a which contain several options regarding depositions taken in foreign
could be ordered." 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 242, at 14 (2d ed.
1982). Under the amended rule:
This will still be an important factor in deciding whether the necessary "exceptional
circumstances" are present, but when the question is close the court may allow a
deposition in order to preserve the testimony of a witness and put off until trial deci-
sion on whether the deposition will be admitted as evidence.
Id.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 170-91.
19. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(b).
20. To date, the United States has agreements in effect with only six nations that provide
for reciprocal jurisdiction over detainees or prisoners transferred abroad for purposes of con-
frontation at trial or to serve as witnesses: Canada, the Cayman Islands, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, and Turkey. See supra note 6. Under all six of these mutual assistance
treaties, the prisoner must voluntarily agree to testify when asked to appear as a witness.
21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e).
22. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Note on 1974 Amendment) (stat-
ing Congress' view that doubts as to the underlying constitutionality of permitting use at trial
of government depositions were resolved in 1970 by California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970),
discussed infra at notes 78-84, 122 and accompanying text); see also United States v. Kelly,
892 F.2d 255, 260-63 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3243 (1990); United States v.
Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 946, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Sines, 761 F.2d 1434, 1441-42
(9th Cir. 1985).
23. "The procedure prescribed is similar to that in civil cases, Rules 28-31, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure .. " FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules, Note to Subdivision (b)).
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countries.24 In practice, however, when a potential prosecution or defense
witness is beyond United States jurisdiction, reasons of sovereignty usually
necessitate that the party needing the rule 15 deposition make a motion for a
formal request by "letter rogatory' ' 25 from the United States court to a judi-
cial authority in the foreign nation.26 Such a request, if granted, subjects the
parties to the incompatibilities of the foreign nation's law and to the proce-
dural discretion of the foreign authority conducting the deposition. A rule
15 deposition thus may have to be obtained abroad under any number of
circumstances that conffict with rule 15's own strictures and the evidence
rules it incorporates.2" Therefore, an American judge may ultimately deny
admission of the deposition at a criminal trial because the procedures used
failed to provide the opposing party adequate opportunity for cross-exami-
nation, and because of other deviations from United States evidence law.29
24. See FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b). The rule provides that foreign depositions may be taken in
three ways:
(1) on notice before a person authorized to administer oaths in the place in which the
examination is held, either by the law thereof or by the law of the United States, or
(2) before a person commissioned by the [United States] court, ... or (3) pursuant to
a letter rogatory .... Evidence obtained in response to a letter rogatory need not be
excluded merely for the reason that it is not a verbatim transcript or that the testi-
mony was not taken under oath or for any similar departure from the requirements
for depositions taken within the United States under these rules.
id.
25. See id.; see also 111(a) UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-13.510 (1988)
("Obtaining Evidence Abroad: General Considerations ... Most problems associated with
international evidence gathering revolve around the concept of sovereignty. Virtually every
nation vests responsibility for enforcing criminal laws in the sovereign."); supra note 2.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
27. See 111(a) UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-13.535. The manual states:
Depositions pursuant to formal requests must be taken in accordance with the laws
and procedures of the place where the request is executed. In some cases, those laws
do not contemplate direct examination by attorneys for the parties, or even the pres-
ence of both parties. In most civil law countries, for example, the questioning of
witnesses is done by the judge. Other countries limit videotaping or even verbatim
transcripts. Administering an oath to a witness may be prohibited if he or she is a
potential defendant. The request may ask that the deposition be conducted in ac-
cordance with U.S. procedures but such requests will be honored only if they do not
violate local laws, the resources for compliance are available, and the significance of
the request is understood by the executing authority.
Id.; see also United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988). This case states that:
[F]oreign laws do not always permit witnesses to be deposed in the manner to
which American courts and lawyers are accustomed. In certain cases, the use of
unconventional foreign methods of examination may exceed the limits of accepted
American standards of fairness and reliability, such as underlie the confrontation
clause and the rule against hearsay.
Id. at 946.
28. Salim, 855 F.2d at 946.
29. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1), infra note 57.
United States v. Salim
In the case of a prosecution witness, the deposition may independently defy
admission for a lack of adequate confrontation, which is guaranteed to the
defendant by the sixth amendment's confrontation clause.30
In the fifteen years since Congress amended rule 15 to permit government
depositions, federal courts have decided about a dozen cases involving chal-
lenges to the use of such evidence obtained in eight foreign countries. 31 The
courts have decided more than half of these cases in the past five years.32
While each of these cases presented some question as to the proper proce-
dural, evidentiary, or constitutional limits on the use of prosecution deposi-
tions taken abroad, 33 in only one case, United States v. Salim, 34 was the
actual conduct of the foreign deposition sufficiently awry of American proce-
dures to merit serious challenge on both statutory and confrontation clause
grounds.3 5
In Salim, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en-
countered an amalgam of foreign-imposed deposition procedures far more
divergent from American norms than courts had considered in any previous
rule 15 cases.36 Chief among the problems in the case, which involved a
deposition conducted in France, was that French law precluded both the
defendant Salim, a suspected drug trafficker, and his defense attorney from
attending the deposition. French law also required a French judge to ques-
tion the deponent, which the presiding judge agreed to do based on written
interrogatories the American parties submitted in advance. 37 French law
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a... trial, by an impartial jury... and... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him .. " See also supra notes 22, 27.
31. United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, and United States v. Gifford, 892 F.2d 263 (3d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3243 (1990) (Belgium) (related cases); United States v.
Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990) (Switzerland);
United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988) (France); United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d
354 (7th Cir. 1986) (Bahamas); United States v. Sines, 761 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1985) (Thai-
land); United States v. Johnpoll, 739 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1075 (1984)
(Switzerland); United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982)
(Bermuda); United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912
(1981) (Italy); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 966
(1977) (Japan); and United States v. Badalamenti, No. 84 Cr. 236 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1985)
(WESTLAW, U.S. Dist. Ct. database) (Switzerland); see discussion of these cases infra notes
139-209 and accompanying text; see also Mehler, Use of Foreign Depositions In Federal Crimi-
nal Trials, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 3, 1988, at 2 & n.5, col. 2.
32. See supra note 31.
33. See infra notes 139-209 and accompanying text.
34. 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 139-209. See generally Mehler, supra note 31, at 2
& n.5, col. 2.
36. See infra notes 139-209 and accompanying text.
37. Salim, 855 F.2d at 947-48.
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further permitted the deponent, herself charged with drug trafficking in
France, to preview these written questions and to confer with her attorney
before responding. 38 French law also barred the prosecution's use of both
open phone lines and videotaping at the deposition. As a result of these
foreign deposition requirements, Salim was wholly excluded from participa-
tion in the proceeding, and the jury at his subsequent American trial was
denied a first-hand view of the deponent's demeanor during questioning.
39
Mindful that the French legal model is far more common abroad than the
American system," the Salim court chose to sanction these foreign deposi-
tion procedures. In particular, the Salim court held that a foreign court's
refusal to abide by American methods of taking depositions should not pre-
clude the prosecution from seeking to uncover this evidence abroad under
rule 15.41 The court further held that unless the foreign methods used to
obtain the deposition are inherently unreliable, a deposition taken in con-
formance with the host country's law generally satisfies United States law for
purposes of admission into evidence.42
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 951 ("It is evident that it is not always possible to take a deposition in a foreign
country in the manner that we might prefer, or even that we might require for a deposition
taken domestically"); see also United States v. Salim, 664 F. Supp. 682, 688 (E.D.N.Y. 1987),
aff'd, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988) (" 'The French administration of justice, far more than the
Anglo-American, has become a model abroad' ") (quoting H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND
AND FRANCE (1975)).
41. Salim, 855 F.2d at 949-950. The court stated that:
[T]he purpose of [Rule 15] should [not] be subverted by allowing the presence re-
quirement of Rule 15(b) to become an obstacle that prevents the deposition from
being taken at all. A sovereign nation is entitled to refuse to acquiesce in the use
within its borders of American methods of gathering, preserving, and presenting evi-
dence; such refusal, however, should not automatically and invariably cause the pros-
ecution to abandon its efforts to obtain evidence abroad.
id.
42. Id. at 953. The court stated:
In short, unless the manner of examination required by the law of the host nation is
so incompatible with our fundamental principles of fairness or so prone to inaccuracy
or bias as to render the testimony inherently unreliable (or, in the words of the advi-
sory notes to Rule 28, are 'so devoid of substance or probative value as to warrant its
exclusion altogether'), a deposition taken pursuant to letter rogatory in accordance
with the law of the host nation is taken 'in compliance with law' for purposes of Rule
804(b)(1).
Id. The Second Circuit reaffirmed this view in the much publicized "Pizza Connection" drug
trafficking case, United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1138 (1990); see infra notes 150-54, 208-09 and accompanying text. Casamento quoted the
above language from Salim in holding that a deponent's affirmation to a foreign tribunal to tell
the truth satisfied the "oath or affirmation" requirement of rule 603, Federal Rule of Evidence.
Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1175.
United States v. Salim
The Salim decision thus provides a benchmark for assessing the accepta-
bility to American courts of the gamut of incompatible deposition proce-
dures that American prosecutors are likely to encounter abroad.4 3 Further,
the decision squarely addresses the leeway the law presently affords prosecu-
tors in the conduct and use of foreign depositions.
This Note examines the development of the evidential and constitutional
standards applicable when a federal prosecutor seeks to take a rule 15 depo-
sition in a foreign country and introduce it at an American trial. Next, this
Note examines rule 15 itself in the context of its legislative history and dis-
cusses how federal courts have applied the rule thus far in prosecutions ex-
tending beyond United States borders. This Note then examines the Second
Circuit's efforts in United States v. Salim to accommodate diverse foreign
procedures to American evidence law and the Constitution so as to "prevent
a failure of justice," the intent of rule 15." This Note shows that the Salim
court's treatment of the foreign deposition essentially as a matter of eviden-
tiary weight and sufficiency, rather than admissibility, is amply supported by
Supreme Court decisions governing hearsay and confrontation. This Note
further shows that the Salim court's construction of rule 15 comports with
congressional intent, if not with the letter of the rule 15 presence require-
ment, to effectuate justice in circumstances that Congress arguably had not
foreseen. This Note concludes that the Salim court's holding delineates a
broad avenue of approach for prosecutors in need of pivotal testimony lo-
cated outside United States jurisdiction.
I. EVIDENTIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS FOR RULE 15
Congress provided in rule 15 that testimony preserved under the rule may
be used as substantive evidence at criminal trials.45 A trial judge may admit
this testimony so long as (1) the witness who testified is unavailable at trial,
and (2) the testimony is "otherwise admissible under the rules of evi-
43. See Mehler, supra note 31, at 6, col. 4 ("The Salim decision significantly broadens the
ability of criminal lawyers to gather and introduce testimony obtained abroad"). The author
of this news article is an Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York and served as both trial and appellate counsel in United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d
Cir. 1988). The article provides an analysis of the Second Circuit's decision in Salim.
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Notes of Advisory Committee on
Rules, Note to Subdivision (a)).
45. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e). Use as substantive evidence means that the trier of fact,
usually a jury in a criminal case, may consider the statement for its literal truth. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Note on 1974 Amendment).
1990]
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dence."'  Incorporated within the rules of evidence is the hearsay rule, a
principle that categorically bars juries from hearing out-of-court statements
offered for their truth.47 The hearsay rule has a well-established exception,
however, governing "former testimony" evidence for which depositions can
qualify.4"
The prosecution's use of rule 15 also implicates the sixth amendment's
confrontation clause, which guarantees criminal defendants the right to con-
front the witnesses against them at trial.4 9 This constitutional guarantee also
has exceptions. 50 Prosecutors and courts must therefore be mindful of the
law governing both the hearsay rule and the confrontation right when ad-
dressing rule 15 matters. The Supreme Court's interpretation of both the
confrontation clause and the former testimony exception has undergone sig-
nificant development in the past 25 years.
A. The Hearsay Rule and the Former Testimony Exception
The hearsay rule originated in Anglo-American law about 500 years ago
in response to the English common-law practice of trying criminal defend-
ants based on ex parte affidavits and depositions.51 The premise of the rule is
to exclude out-of-court statements because they lack three intertwined pro-
tections that courts consider vital to fostering truthfulness: (1) testimony
under oath; (2) by a witness subject to cross-examination; (3) with opportu-
nity for the trier of fact to scrutinize the witness' demeanor during
testimony.
52
Exceptions gradually have eroded the basic hearsay rule.53 At early com-
mon law, for example, a restrictive exception for depositions existed that
required the presence of the criminal defendant during the deposition; the
Supreme Court recognized this deposition exception as early as 1904. 5' The
46. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e). Section (e) also allows for admission of the deposition for
impeachment purposes when the witness is available at trial and gives inconsistent testimony.
Section (e) incorporates the definition of unavailability contained in FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
47. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (defining hearsay) and 802 (excluding hearsay).
48. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
49. U.S. CONST. amend VI; see supra notes 22, 27, 30 and accompanying text.
50. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 243 (1895)); see infra text accompanying notes 89-93.
51. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 223 (1954); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 156-57 & nn.9-10 (1970).
52. See Green, 399 U.S. at 154-55; see also FED. R. EVID. Article VIII advisory commit-
tee's note (Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem).
53. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62.
54. See West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 262 (1904). The common law exception permit-
ted the reading of the deposition at trial when the deponent was dead, insane, too sick to
attend, or absent "by the connivance of the defendant." Id. This common-law right was con-
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rationale supporting such exceptions was that the statements they admitted
into evidence were made under circumstances that furnished guarantees of
trustworthiness which offset the absence of oath, cross-examination, and
scrutiny." The drafters of the uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, which
Congress adopted in 1975, observed that the modern emphasis has been on
the second of these factors, cross-examination, as the prime guarantor of
witness veracity.56 Accordingly, rule 804(b)(1), which codified the former
testimony exception, requires that the defendant have had an opportunity
and similar motive to develop the former testimony by examination of the
witness.5 7 In its criminal context, the rule does not require a defendant to
have been present when the former testimony was taken, indicating that an
absent defendant who is represented by counsel will be held to have the req-
uisite opportunity to develop the testimony given. Rule 804(b)(1) expressly
excepts depositions taken in compliance with the law from exclusion under
the hearsay rule.58
B. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the "Rule of
Necessity" Doctrine
By 1895, the Supreme Court recognized that the primary object of the
sixth amendment confrontation clause was to establish a constitutional bar
to the same injustice of trial by deposition that the hearsay rule addressed.59
The Court perceived, however, that a literal application of the confrontation
clause would exclude from evidence, as would the hearsay rule, all state-
ments made by declarants not present at trial.' The Court rejected such an
ditioned, however, on the the presence of the defendant at the deposition, his representation by
counsel there, and the opportunity for cross-examination. Id.
55. FED. R. EVID. Article VIII advisory committee's note (Introductory Note: The Hear-
say Problem); see Green, 399 U.S. at 154.
56. FED. R. EVID. Article VIII advisory committee's note (Introductory Note: The Hear-
say Problem).
57. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the
same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the
course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is
now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an




59. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1970) (quoting Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
60. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1980) (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).
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absolute constitutional bar as unintended and too extreme.6" Accordingly,
the Supreme Court held, and has consistently maintained, that the confron-
tation right is subject to a "rule of necessity" 62 under which a criminal de-
fendant's constitutional protections must sometimes yield to public policy
considerations and the necessities of a case.6 3
Despite the Supreme Court's long recognition of the confrontation
clause's general exclusionary role, however, successful use of the clause to
attack evidence properly admitted under hearsay exceptions is a relatively
recent occurrence." This fact is largely attributable to the inapplicability of
the confrontation clause to state criminal proceedings until 1965, when, in
Pointer v. Texas, 65 the Supreme Court applied the clause to bar admission of
preliminary hearing testimony from use at trial.66 Until that time, in the few
federal criminal cases in which the clause was applied,67 it was construed as
a constitutional embodiment of the hearsay rule, allowing for such tradi-
tional exceptions as dying declarations and former trial testimony of de-
ceased witnesses.6 s
In the years since Pointer, the Supreme Court has construed the confron-
tation right as granting two specific protections to criminal defendants: (1)
an implied opportunity for full and effective cross-examination of hostile wit-
nesses,69 and (2) a literal right to meet face-to-face all those who appear and
61. Id.
62. Id. at 65.
63. Id. at 64 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).
64. FED. R. EVID. Article VIII advisory committee's note (Note on Confrontation and
Due Process).
65. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
66. Id. at 406. In Pointer, the state proffered at trial the transcript of a crucial witness'
testimony that had been taken at a preliminary hearing at which the defendant had not been
represented by counsel. Id. at 401. The trial judge admitted the testimony over defense objec-
tions, "apparently in part because, as the judge viewed it, [the defendant] had been present...
and therefore had been 'accorded the opportunity of cross examining the witnesses there
against him.'" Id. at 402. The Supreme Court applied the confrontation clause to the state
prosecution as incident to the fourteenth amendment and held that "[b]ecause the transcript
... had not been taken at a time and under circumstances affording [the defendant] through
counsel an adequate opportunity to cross-examine [the witness]," the transcript's introduction
in a federal criminal case would have violated the sixth amendment's guarantee of confronta-
tion. Id. at 407.
67. FED. R. EVID. Article VIII advisory committee's note (Note on Confrontation and
Due Process) ("Until very recently, decisions invoking the confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment were surprisingly few, a fact probably explainable by the former inapplicability of
the clause to the states and by the hearsay rule's occupancy of much the same ground.").
68. Id.; see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 & n.8 (1980).
69. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); see also United States v. Owens, 484
U.S. 554, 557 (1988); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987).
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give evidence at trial.7" The core goal of the first protection is to promote
reliability in truth-finding at criminal trials.71 The aim of the second, while
more ethereal, is to foster "the perception as well as the reality" that fairness
prevails.72
1. The Confrontation Clause-Hearsay Conundrum
Just a few years after the Supreme Court's Pointer decision invited sixth
amendment review of state criminal appeals, Justice Byron White, writing
for the Court in the seminal case California v. Green,73 perceived the per-
sistent conundrum of reconciling application of the growing number of hear-
say exceptions with the confrontation clause.74 Justice White determined
that while the hearsay rule is designed generally to protect values similar to
those of the confrontation clause, the overlap is not complete. 75 In short, the
Court observed that evidence which is properly admissible under hearsay
exceptions may well violate the confrontation right, while evidence admitted
in contravention of recognized hearsay exceptions may fully satisfy
confrontation.76
Until a decade ago, the Supreme Court took a largely ad hoc approach to
sorting out these evidential and constitutional distinctions.77 But by 1970,
the Court had acknowledged in its Green decision that policing state initia-
tives to create new hearsay exceptions would raise recurring questions about
the compatibility of these exceptions with the confrontation right, and there-
fore would require assessment of the reasons for, and fundamental scope of,
the clause.78
70. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988) (quoting Harlan, J., in Green, 399 U.S. at
175).
71. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 737.
72. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986)).
73. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
74. Id. at 155-56.
75. Id. at 155.
76. Id. at 155-56.
77. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The opinion stated:
This Court, in a series of cases, has sought to accommodate [the] competing inter-
ests [between the hearsay exceptions and the confrontation clause]. True to com-
mon-law tradition, the process has been gradual, building on past decisions, drawing
on new experience, and responding to changing conditions. The Court has not
sought to "map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine the
validity of all ... hearsay exceptions." But a general approach to the problem is
discernible.
Id at 64-65 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 162).
78. Green, 399 U.S. at 156.
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2 Implying the Right to Adequate Opportunity for Cross-Examination
a. The Evolving Former Testimony Exception and the Confrontation
Clause
In assessing the scope of the confrontation clause, the Green Court postu-
lated that an absent declarant's testimony, taken at a preliminary hearing
where counsel represented the defendant, might satisfy confrontation at trial
when admitted as a hearsay exception, even though such pretrial proceeding
is usually less probative than the trial itself.79 Green did not involve an ab-
sent declarant; rather, the witness at issue, a teenager, was present on the
stand but claimed no recall of the events underlying his prior preliminary
hearing testimony, in which he had identified the accused.8 0 But the Green
Court recognized that most of the Supreme Court's confrontation clause de-
cisions involved the recurrent situation of a trial court admitting out-of-
court statements of absent declarants under exceptions to the hearsay rule."1
79. Id. at 165-66.
The Green Court also recognized that the Supreme Court had never excluded prior state-
ments by available declarants from evidence on confrontation grounds. Id. at 161. It con-
cluded that history gave good reason not to bar such statements, provided the requisite
opportunity for effective cross-examination existed at trial, together with the oath and jury
scrutiny. Id. at 158. The Court characterized effective cross-examination generally as that
affording the jury "a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement." Id. at
161.
80. Id. at 152. In Green, a teenage witness had identified the defendant as his drug sup-
plier both in an out-of-court statement to a policeman and later under oath at a preliminary
hearing in which the witness was cross-examined extensively by defense counsel. At trial,
however, the witness professed no recall of dealing with the defendant, attributing his mental
lapse to LSD he took before the deal. Both prior inconsistent statements were admitted as
substantive evidence at trial and were later ruled inadmissible by the California Supreme
Court. Id. at 151-53.
On review, the United States Supreme Court held that the unsworn statement was improp-
erly excluded by the California Supreme Court because the witness had been available at trial
for cross-examination, despite his mental lapse, and was under oath and subject to jury scru-
tiny. Id. at 166-67 (footnote omitted). The Court reserved the question of whether a witness's
professed lack of memory regarding his own out-of-court statement might critically affect
cross-examination beyond confrontation clause bounds, but it noted that authorities stood di-
vided on the issue and that common-law practice would likely deny admission of the unsworn
statement. Id. at 168-69, 169 n.18.
Of more importance here, the Green Court also held that the sworn statement was improp-
erly excluded, even absent the opportunity for full cross-examination at trial, because confron-
tation was satisfied at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 165. The Court saw no reason to exclude
such past sworn testimony of a present witness, whether he claimed memory loss, privilege, or
simply refused to answer, when the same would be admissible, under established hearsay ex-
ceptions, if the witness were physically unavailable. Id. at 166-67.
81. Id. at 161.
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With this in mind, the Court observed that its usual theory allowed absent
declarants' statements into evidence if the statements bore "other indicia of
'reliability'" deriving from the circumstances under which they were
taken. 2 Applying this logic to former testimony, the Green Court enumer-
ated several indicia of reliability that would support admission of the teenage
witness' pretrial statement even if he actually had been unavailable to testify
at trial. Specifically, the Court noted that: (1) the witness was under oath at
the prior proceeding; (2) the defendant had counsel at that proceeding who
had ample opportunity to cross-examine the witness, and (3) the proceeding
was conducted before a judicial tribunal equipped to record it. 3 Despite
these findings, the Green Court still declined to chart a general theory of the
confrontation clause to govern hearsay exceptions admitting statements of
unavailable declarants.r
4
b. Adopting a "General Approach" to Confrontation and Hearsay:
Ohio v. Roberts
Ten years later, in the wake of Congress' passage in 1975 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and amended rule 15, the Supreme Court moved to unify
82. Id. at 161-62. The Court also indicated that the government's good faith efforts to
ensure confrontation with the declarant had been a prerequisite to admission of unavailable
declarants' statements, even when these statements bore indicia of reliability. Id.
83. Id. at 165. Note that in 1980, in Roberts, the Court categorically rejected the charac-
terization by the Ohio Supreme Court that this analysis, contained in Part III of the Green
opinion, was "dictum." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 69-70 n. 10 (1980). The Roberts Court
also rejected Green's characterization by the United States Solicitor General as an "alternative
holding." The Roberts Court stated that either view "would diminish Green's precedential
significance." Id.
84. Green, 399 U.S. at 162. Six months after Green, the Court applied for the first time
the indicia of reliability as a discrete precept to uphold admission of an absent declarant's
statement. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), the Court held that admission of third-
party testimony relating to an unavailable co-conspirator's statement, which identified the ac-
cused as a murderer, did not violate the confrontation clause since the statement bore separate
indicia of reliability inherent in the circumstances under which it was made: specifically, that
the statement was made during concealment of the conspiracy. Id. at 77-78, 88-90.
Because Dutton concerned the long-recognized hearsay exception for co-conspirator's state-
ments (see Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (noting that admissibility of co-
conspirators' statements was first established by the Supreme Court in 1827)), it is largely
inapposite to the admissibility problems posed by the former testimony exception. Dutton is
significant here, however, for its characterization of discernible reliability indicia such as the
motive and circumstances of the declarant when he spoke, and the existence of facts to corrob-
orate his statement as "determinative of whether [such] statement may be placed before the
jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant." Id. at 89 (emphasis added). This use
of reliability indicia as dispositive of admissibility of an absent declarant's statement foreshad-
owed the Court's decision a decade later in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), in which the
Court finally discerned a "general approach" to the problem of determining the constitutional
validity of hearsay exceptions. Id. at 65; see infra text accompanying footnotes 90-93.
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its piecemeal approach to confrontation and hearsay. In Ohio v. Roberts, 15
the Supreme Court defined the "rule of necessity" that qualifies a defend-
ant's confrontation guarantee.8 6 In Roberts, a woman's pretrial testimony as
a defense witness for her boyfriend was offered at his trial, where she failed
to appear, to rebut the boyfriend's assertions that he was innocent of stealing
from the woman's parents. 7 The Court held that, because defense counsel's
direct examination of the woman at the pretrial hearing took the form of
cross-examination, including leading questions and challenges to her verac-
ity, her testimony was admissible under the confrontation clause. 88
Beyond this decision on witness examination, the Roberts decision is vital
because of the "general approach" 9 it provides prosecutors to win admis-
sion of prior statement hearsay over confrontation clause objection. Even in
cases in which the prior statement was taken subject to cross-examination,
the Roberts Court said the sixth amendment requires the prosecutor either to
produce the witness at trial or to demonstrate the witness' unavailability.9
When unavailability is established, Roberts conditions admission of the state-
ment wholly on the prosecutor's further showing that it bears adequate "in-
dicia of reliability" to warrant its submission to the jury.9' The prosecutor
may establish this reliability in one of two ways according to Roberts: (1) by
showing that the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception
from which reliability may be inferred without more support; or (2) by iden-
85. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
86. Id. at 65.
87. Id. at 58-60.
88. Id. at 70-73. In Roberts, the Court declined to decide: (1) whether the Ohio Supreme
Court, which affirmed reversal of the defendant's conviction, properly disregarded the United
States Supreme Court's statements in Green suggesting that the mere opportunity to cross-
examine at a preliminary hearing rendered the prior testimony admissible, and (2) whether de
minimis questioning by defense counsel is sufficient for admission. Id. at 70.
89. Id. at 65.
90. Id. Specifically, the Court said:
In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), the
prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant
whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.... [O]nce a witness is shown
to be unavailable...:
"The focus of the Court's concern has been to insure that there 'are indicia of
reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement
may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant,' and
to 'afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement ... '
Id. at 65-66 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) and California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970)).
91. Id. at 66.
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tifying particularized guarantees of trustworthiness9 2 such as specific facts
that demonstrate the statement's truth.93
In addition to providing this general approach, Roberts served to resolve
the recurring question94 of how effective a defense counsel's cross-examina-
tion must be at a prior court proceeding to satisfy confrontation require-
ments at trial. The Court held that normally no inquiry into effectiveness is
required for testimony to be admitted. 95 Where adequate opportunity for
cross-examination existed, and where defense counsel availed the defendant
of that opportunity, the Roberts Court held that the sixth amendment con-
frontation requirement is satisfied.96
c. Post-Roberts Case Law
In United States v. Inadi,97 and in Bourjaily v. United States,98 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed and further developed the approach to unavaila-
bility and reliability indicia explicated in Roberts. In Inadi, the Court made
clear that a showing of the declarant's unavailability is not required for ad-
mission of a co-conspirator's statement, because the statement derives its
reliability from the context in which it was made, the context'being while the
conspiracy was in progress.99 This context, the Court explained, is what
makes a co-conspirator's statement "irreplaceable" as substantive evi-
dence.lc ° In contrast, the Court observed that unavailability is intrinsic to
admission of former testimony because it is not the best evidence, but only a
weaker substitute for live testimony.'0° Thus, the Inadi Court stated that
92. Id
93. C. FISHMAN & L. BARRACATO, EVIDENCE 5-104 (1988).
94. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1970) (discussing the quality of
prior cross-examination required in context of Mattox and Pointer); see also United States v.
Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 558-59 (1988) (discussing the quality of cross-examination required at
trial; citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) and Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15
(1985); and reaffirming that "[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only 'an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish.'" (quoting Stincer, 484 U.S. at 739; emphasis in
original)).
95. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73 n.12. The one exception noted by the Court was when defense
counsel has been found ineffective prior to trial. Id.
96. Id
97. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
98. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
99. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395-96. FED. R. EvD. 801(d)(2)(E) governs admission of a co-
conspirator's statements in federal proceedings.
100. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396.
101. Id. at 394.
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the reliability of former testimony rests in part on the similarities between
prior judicial proceedings and trial proceedings.' °2
In Bourjaily, the Supreme Court went a step further regarding co-conspir-
ators' statements to absolve trial courts of making any inquiry into the relia-
bility of such statements before admitting them. 103 The Court provided no
such waiver for the former testimony exception; rather, it affirmed Roberts'
general directive that no independent inquiry into reliability is required
when the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.'°4 Fur-
ther, Bouraily "suggested that 'firmly rooted' means firmly rooted in history
and common law," as opposed to legislation, and implied that "a reliability
inquiry is required where an evidentiary rule is broader in scope than its
common law antecedent."'' 0 5 To date, the Supreme Court has not expressly
stated whether the hearsay exception for former testimony, including deposi-
tion testimony allowed under rule 804(b)(1), is firmly enough rooted in com-
mon law to warrant dispensing with an independent inquiry into the
reliability of the former testimony.
3. The Literal Right to Face-to-Face Encounter: Coy v. Iowa
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that the confrontation
clause reflects a preference for the accused to confront his accuser face-to-
face at trial."° The Court has also acknowledged that this preference may
be waived under certain conditions, however, such as when the accuser is
unavailable despite the government's good faith efforts to produce him at
trial.'°0 What remains unclear from the Court's decisions is whether physi-
cal confrontation, as opposed to only cross-examination by defense counsel,
is a prerequisite at pretrial hearings in order for testimony taken there to be
constitutionally admissible at a subsequent trial where the accuser is ab-
sent.' 08 Assuming that a right to physical encounter does extend to pretrial
102. Id. at 395.
103. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987).
104. Id.
105. C. FISHMAN & L. BARRACATO, supra note 93, at 5-103.
106. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 65 (1980) and cases cited therein; see also Coy v.
Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800-03 (1988), and cases cited therein.
107. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
108. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970). There, the Court enumerated
the reliability indicia supporting admission of former testimony: (1) that the witness was
under oath; (2) that the defendant was represented by counsel and (3) that the proceeding was
before a court equipped to record it. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 83. The Court
adopted these reliability indicia wholesale in Roberts. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 69. In neither
Green nor Roberts did the Court indicate that the defendant's own presence at the preliminary
hearing was a prerequisite to admission of the former testimony at trial. This was also true in
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987), in which the defendant was excluded from a pretrial
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proceedings, a further question remains whether this right is also amenable
to waiver in certain exigent cases.
The Supreme Court's decision in Coy v. Iowa"9 provides some limited
guidance regarding these questions. In Coy, the Court invalidated a statute
designed to allow children who are victims of sex crimes to avoid facing their
alleged abusers at trial. 110 The Court held that the mere legislative presump-
tion that children would suffer trauma from encountering the accused 1. was
not sufficient to overcome what Justice Antonin Scalia called the "irreduci-
ble" literal meaning of the confrontation clause that the defendant possesses
a right to a face-to-face encounter at trial." 2 In so holding, the Court reiter-
ated that the rights the confrontation clause confers on defendants are not
necessarily absolute, but the Court deferred the question whether any excep-
tions exist to physical confrontation of available declarants for later
consideration. 1
3
The statute reviewed in Coy, which allowed the use of a screen to separate
accuser and accused, 1 4 had the potential effect of preventing altogether
physical confrontation between accuser and accused. 1 5 Use of such a
screen could result in an accuser never being forced to face an accused,
although available to do so, either prior to trial, at trial, or ever. Coy did not
address the potential for such overall denial of physical confrontation, but
confined itself to the right to physical encounter of available witnesses at
trial."16 However, the Coy decision posited hypothetically that if this trial
witness competency hearing at which he was represented by counsel. Id. at 732-33. The
Stincer Court rejected the defendant's claim that his exclusion violated his right to confronta-
tion, in part because the defendant was permitted to physically confront and cross-examine the
witnesses at trial, id. at 744, but also because his counsel attended and participated in the
pretrial hearing. Id. at 740.
109. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
110. Id. at 2799 & n. 1. "The State suggests that the confrontation interest at stake here
was outweighed by the necessity of protecting victims of sexual abuse." Id. at 2802.
111. "The State maintains that [public policy] necessity is established here by the statute,
which creates a legislatively imposed presumption of trauma." Id. at 2803.
112. Id.
113. Id at 2802-03.
114. Id. at 2799 & n. 1. The screen blocked the child from seeing the defendant but allowed
the defendant to see the child. Id.
115. Presumably, the victims and the defendants in Coy did not encounter each other at
any time between the attack and the trial, although this is not stated in the Supreme Court
opinion.
116. Id. at 2800-03. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, makes oblique reference to "the
asserted right to face-to-face confrontation at some point in the proceedings other than the
trial itself." Id. at 2802-03. In making this reference, he cites to the Court's decision in Ken-
tucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987). See supra note 108. This reference appears to indicate a
right asserted by the defendant in the Stincer case, but rejected by the Court in that case, that
the defendant bore an absolute right to be present at a pretrial witness competency hearing
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right to physical confrontation were amenable to exceptions, these excep-
tions would be allowed only on important public policy grounds.117 Thus,
the Coy Court admitted, without specifics, the general requirement that an
accused must physically encounter all available witnesses may yield to cer-
tain policy concerns.11 This concession by the Court, that the right to
physical encounter may not be absolute, could logically extend to witnesses
testifying at pretrial hearings who will be unavailable for trial.119 Coy left
unresolved the question of which, if any, public policy reasons are suffi-
ciently grave to warrant waiving the defendant's right to physical
confrontation. 120
II. CHANGED RULES, MIXED SIGNALS: CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON
RULE 15 AND THE FORMER TESTIMONY EXCEPTION
A. Amendment of Rule 15 and Adoption of Component Rule 804(b)(1)
Congress believed that the Supreme Court's decision in California v.
Green 121 resolved all doubt about the constitutionality of amending Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 to permit prosecutors to take and use the
depositions of inculpatory witnesses. 122 Congress also depended on Green
because it was a crucial phase of his trial. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 735. Because the defendant in
Stincer did confront his accusers at trial, however, Justice Scalia's reference in the Coy opinion
seems inapposite to the question of whether a defendant may be denied physical confrontation
of witnesses who are unavailable at trial.
117. Coy, 107 S. Ct. at 2803. Justice O'Connor, writing in concurrence for herself and
Justice White, fully approved future use of "something other than face-to-face confrontation if
that procedure was necessary to further an important public policy." Id. at 2805. Justice
Blackmun and Chief Justice Rehnquist, though dissenting from the majority's rejection of the
Iowa statute, appeared to agree strongly with this proposition. See, e.g., id. at 2806.
118. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
119. This is true because the Roberts decision requires that former testimony of unavailable
declarants be found independently reliable before it may be admitted at trial. See supra text
accompanying notes 90-93. The focus of this reliability inquiry is whether the accused was
afforded adequate opportunity for cross-examination and whether facts exist that corroborate
the statement, and not whether the defendant is physically present at the pretrial hearing. See
id.; see also supra text accompanying note 88.
120. Several federal circuit courts have concluded that grand jury testimony may be admis-
sible at trial if it is sufficiently corroborated by circumstantial evidence supporting its veracity.
See infra note 325. Generally, defendants do not appear at grand jury proceedings; thus, a
grand jury witness' testimony is conceivably admissible at trial even though that witness is
unavailable at trial and has never encountered the defendant. Id.
121. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
122. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Note on 1974 Amendment) states:
Because neither the [Supreme] Court nor the standing committee [on rules of prac-
tice and procedure] gave reasons for rejecting the government deposition proposal [in
1970], it is not possible to know why they were not approved. To the extent that the
rejection was based upon doubts as to the constitutionality of such a proposal, those
doubts now seem resolved by California v. Green.
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when codifying Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1).' 2 3 Section (e) of rule 15
implicitly incorporates rule 804(b)(1) by allowing use of a deposition at trial
only when it is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.124
B. The Anomaly of the Presence Requirement for Prosecution Depositions
Congress included in rule 15(b) the express requirement that the govern-
ment produce the defendant at the deposition and keep such defendant in
the witness' presence throughout the examination.12 No similar require-
ment appears in rule 804(b)(1). Rule 804, as originally proposed to Congress
by the Supreme Court, actually would have allowed for the admission of
former testimony from a prior proceeding at which the instant defendant
was not present to confront the witness, but where only another defendant
"with motive and interest similar" to the instant defendant afforded confron-
tation. 126 While rule 804(b)(1) as adopted by Congress permits such substi-
Id.
123. See FED. R. EvID. 804 advisory committee's note:
The common law did not limit the admissibility of former testimony to that given
in an earlier trial of the same case, although it did require identity of issues as a
means of insuring that the former handling of the witness was the equivalent of what
would now be done if the opportunity were presented .... Testimony given at a
preliminary hearing was held in California v. Green to satisfy confrontation require-
ments in this respect.
Id. (citation omitted).
124. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e) provides that at trial, part or all of the deposition, "so far as
otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence," may be used as substantive evidence if the
witness is unavailable as defined by FED. R. EvID. 804(a). Id.
125. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(b).
126. See FED. R. EvID. 804 advisory committee's note (Notes of Committee on the Judici-
ary, House Report No. 93-650) ("Rule 804(b)(1) as submitted by the Court allowed prior
testimony of an unavailable witness to be admissible if the party against whom it is offered or a
person 'with motive and interest similar' to his had an opportunity to examine the witness");
see also id. (Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules) which states that:
Unlike the rule [804(b)(1)] .... three [state evidence codes: California, Kansas, and
New Jersey] provide ... that former testimony is not admissible if ... the accused
was not a party to the prior hearing.... Mattox v. United States held that the [con-
frontation] right was not violated by the Government's use, on a retrial of the same
case, of testimony given at the first trial by two witnesses since deceased. The deci-
sion leaves open the questions.. . (3) whether the accused must himself have been a
party to the earlier proceeding or whether a similarly situated person will serve the
purpose. Professor Falknor [in Former Testimony and the Uniform Rules: A Com-
ment, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 659-60 (1963)] concluded that, if dying declaration
untested by cross-examination is constitutionally admissible, former testimony tested
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tution of parties in civil cases, it prohibits substitution in criminal cases."'
Congress' stated reason for changing the proposal, however, was not to en-
sure a face-to-face encounter between witness and defendant at the prior pro-
ceeding. Rather, Congress considered it generally unfair to impose upon a
criminal defendant the onus of someone else's handling of a witness at an-
other defendant's trial.
128
Thus, rule 15(e), which governs admission of depositions at trial by its
implicit incorporation of rule 804(b)(1), appears to comport more closely
with the tenor of Green and prior Supreme Court holdings than does the
presence requirement of rule 15(b).' 29 These holdings, of which Congress
was aware when adopting rule 15,130 suggest that independent indicia of a
deposition's reliability, such as those derived from vigorous cross-examina-
tion by defense counsel during the deposition, may substitute completely for
the defendant's constitutional right to physically confront the deponent.131
Rule 15's presence requirement also stands in contrast to the provision in
rule 15(d) that a deposition shall be taken and filed in the manner provided
in civil actions.' 32 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 31(a) provides that any
party may take testimony by deposition upon written questions. 133 When
amending rule 15, Congress did not alter section (d) to preclude written dep-
osition of prosecution witnesses, and the amendment's legislative history
does not address such an eventuality. 34 Thus, as one authority has noted,
127. Id. (Notes of Committee on The Judiciary, House Report No. 93-650) ("The sole
exception to this... is when a party's predecessor in interest in a civil action or proceeding had
an opportunity and similar motive to examine the witness." (emphasis added)).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., the cases cited in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1970), including
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965); see
also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); see
supra note 84.
130. See FED. R. EVID. Article VIII advisory committee's note (Note on Confrontation
and Due Process).
131. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text; see also 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 17,
§ 244, at 20 (analyzing rule 15(b)'s presence requirement and stating that the confrontation
clause does not always require physical confrontation, even though "the justification for using
a deposition at a criminal trial as evidence against the defendant is much stronger if defendant
has been present or if he has waived his right to be present" at the deposition).
132. The advisory committee's notes to the original rule state that the procedure prescribed
in section (d) "is similar to that in civil cases, Rules 28-31, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules).
Section (d) also provides that the "scope and manner" of examination at the deposition "shall
be such as would be allowed in the trial itself." FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(d).
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 31(a).
134. See 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 242 at 18-19 n.7 (noting that before its amend-
ment, rule 15(d) provided for the defendant to take written depositions, and stating that noth-
ing in the 1975 amendment "indicates a desire to prevent depositions on written questions.").
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"it would seem that a deposition on written questions, as authorized by Civil
Rule 31, would be permissible" under amended rule 15.135 The importance
of this recognition is that written depositions by their design do not contem-
plate physical confrontation between the deponent and the deposing parties.
Congress' reason for putting the express presence requirement in amended
rule 15 is not apparent from either the advisory committee's notes or related
legislative history. 136 Congress possibly intended to afford the accused an
additional protection beyond those provided by rule 804(b)(1) and the con-
frontation clause, even though the presence requirement might preclude the
preservation of testimony in many cases where witnesses are abroad.
137
Equally possible, however, is that Congress simply did not contemplate
transnational prosecutions and overlooked the practical problems of keeping
a jailed felon in custody in locations where there is no authority for pretrial
detention. Neither rule 15 nor its legislative history even mentions the even-
tuality of a foreign situs for the deposition.
138
III. THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS OF PROSECUTION DEPOSITIONS ABROAD
A. Prosecution Depositions Under Confrontation Clause Challenge
1. Facial Constitutionality
The federal judiciary first addressed the use by prosecutors of foreign-ob-
tained depositions in criminal trials in United States v. King. ' 39  In King,
four defendants were charged with conspiracy to import heroin from Thai-
land for distribution in the United States."4 Key to the government's case
was the testimony of two unindicted co-conspirators imprisoned in Japan.'4
The trial court ordered the prisoners' depositions under 18 U.S.C. § 3503,
the precursor and near duplicate of rule 15 applicable to organized crime
135. Id. at 18.
136. See, e.g., the legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act § 601, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3503(b) (1970) (a precursor to rule 15 permitting government depositions of unavailable
witnesses in organized crime cases); see infra note 142; see also 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 17,
§ 244, at 20 (explaining that the original rule 15 was silent on the defendant's right to be
present, and that the presence requirement was included in § 3503 in 1970 and incorporated
into the amended rule 15 in 1975).
137. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3503(f) states that a government deposition taken for use in a criminal
proceeding may be used if, at the time of trial, the witness is outside the United States. Rule 15
substitutes the requirement that the deposition may be used if the witness is unavailable as
defined by FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
139. 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
140. 1d. at 836-38.
141. Id.
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cases.142 Although the King depositions were conducted by an American
consulate using customary procedures, and the defendants and their counsel
were present until the defendants voluntarily left, 143 King is significant be-
cause the defendants challenged section 3503 as facially unconstitutional
based on confrontation and due process grounds.'" In response, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 145 analyzed the constitutional
underpinnings of section 3503, an analytical framework wholly applicable to
rule 15.' 4
In King, the Ninth Circuit found that the Supreme Court's California v.
Green decision 47 compelled that a deposition taken under section 3503 gen-
erally satisfied the procedural safeguards required by the confrontation
clause. 148 The King panel asserted that while the Supreme Court had never
expressly authorized the use of an absent witness' deposition in lieu of trial
testimony, section 3503's procedures provided the jury with a satisfactory




Subsequent court opinions on foreign depositions have resolved several
more particularized constitutional questions involving prosecution deposi-
142. Id. Section 3503, adopted as part of the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act, is virtu-
ally identical to rule 15, with the principal difference being that section 3503 is limited to cases
in which the Attorney General certifies that the defendant is an organized crime suspect. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Note on 1974 Amendment). Section 3503
was drafted by the same advisory committee on federal criminal rules that for 25 years had
proposed generally authorizing government depositions, efforts which culminated in passage of
rule 15. Id.
143., King, 552 F.2d at 838, 841. The depositions in King were also videotaped, allowing
the trial jury to observe witness demeanor. Id. at 841.
144. Id. at 838.
145. The panel included then Judge Anthony Kennedy. Id. at 835.
146. See supra note 142.
147. King, 552 F.2d at 840. The Ninth Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), in which the Court held that a witness residing
abroad was sufficiently beyond state process power as to be unavailable for purposes of the
hearsay exception for former testimony. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 212. Mancusi also held that the
absent witness' testimony at the defendant's trial a decade earlier bore sufficient indicia of
reliability, stemming from defense counsel's adequate opportunity for cross-examination at
that time, to warrant its admission at the defendant's later habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at
213-16; see King, 552 F. 2d at 838-39.
148. King, 552 F.2d at 840. The panel also noted that both the Second and Seventh Cir-
cuits already had considered and rejected confrontation clause challenges to the use at trial of
domestically taken section 3503 depositions. Id. at 839 (citing United States v. Ricketson, 498
F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965 (1974), and United States v. Singleton, 460
F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973)).
149. Id. at 840-41.
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tions taken in foreign countries. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit considered the adequacy of cross-examination in United
States v. Casamento.15o In Casamento, thirty-five defendants faced charges
of drug trafficking and money laundering related to a transnational Mafioso
network that imported heroin to the United States and accumulated the pro-
ceeds in pizza parlors in New York City.1 51 The trial court ordered the
deposition of a prosecution witness in Switzerland pursuant to section
3503,52 but the holding is clearly applicable to rule 15.153 Specifically, the
Second Circuit held that a Swiss magistrate's decision to limit the defense's
cross-examination of the prosecution deponent to the same amount of time
the prosecution had used for direct examination did not violate the confron-
tation rights of the multiple defendants involved in the deposition.
15 4
3. Face-to-Face Confrontation and the Presence Requirement
In another foreign deposition case, United States v. Kelly, 5' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether the con-
frontation clause required exclusion from evidence of a foreign-obtained
prosecution deposition at which defendant Kelly was not physically pres-
ent. 1 56 Kelly was among twenty-seven people charged with conspiracy and
importation of methamphetamine into the United States from Europe.
15 7
Several material witnesses who were Belgian citizens agreed to allow prose-
cutors to depose them in Belgium, and the trial court allowed this under rule
15, on the condition that the prosecution take along Kelly and another in-
custody defendant named Gifford.' Belgian authorities refused to accept
the incarcerated defendants, however, so the trial court permitted telephone
hookups to allow the defendants to take part in the depositions and ordered
150. 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990).
151. Id. at 1148-49.
152. See id at 1172-75.
153. See supra note 142.
154. Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1172-74. The Second Circuit also affirmed the trial court's
holding that a deponent's imprisonment in Switzerland rendered him unavailable to testify at
trial. Id. at 1174. The court further held, citing its decision in Salim, that the deponent's
promise to the Swiss magistrate to testify truthfully satisfied the "oath or affirmation" require-
ments of Federal Rule of Evidence 603. Id. at 1175; see infra note 209 and accompanying text.
155. 892 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3243 (1990).
156. Id at 261.
157. Id at 256-58.
158. Id at 258, 260.
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them videotaped.I59 The depositions were conducted at the American Em-
bassy and followed normal procedures in all other respects.'
60
On appeal of his subsequent conviction to the Third Circuit, Kelly argued,
based on Coy v. Iowa, that the deposition of living, inculpating fact witnesses
who were not co-conspirators, were not incriminating themselves, and were
not in fear of death when speaking, was not a class of testimony permitted at
trial by the confrontation clause without the witnesses' presence there.
1 61
Kelly also argued that his physical absence from the depositions deprived
him of a meaningful role in cross-examining the deponents, further imping-
ing his confrontation right.
162
The Third Circuit rejected these arguments, extracting from the Supreme
Court's decisions in Ohio v. Roberts and Bourjaily v. United States the fol-
lowing rule: Because the confrontation clause and hearsay rule protect simi-
lar values, an out-of-court statement is presumed to have sufficient indicia of
reliability if it falls within an established hearsay exception that is firmly
rooted in American jurisprudence. 163 The court then held that the former
testimony exception is firmly rooted, and found that the Belgian depositions
were taken in compliance with this exception as set forth in evidence rule
804(b)(1). 64 The court concluded that Kelly's ability to listen to the deposi-
tions and talk with counsel by phone cured his deprival of face-to-face
confrontation. 
1 65
159. Id. at 260.
160. Id. The trial court noted that the Belgian depositions were conducted by an American
special master, who placed each witness under the oath normally given in United States courts,
and reported that no limits were placed on the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-
examination. United States v. Gifford, 684 F. Supp. 125, 127 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, United
States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255; United States v. Gifford, 892 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3243 (1990) (related cases). The court further noted that the defendants
were permitted to listen to the proceeding, that they repeatedly conferred privately with coun-
sel over phones located outside the hearing room, and that the deposition was videotaped and
later viewed by the jury at trial. Id.
161. Kelly, 892 F.2d at 261. These arguments presumably refer to the hearsay exceptions
and exclusions for co-conspirators' statements (see FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E)), statements
against interest (see FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3)), and "dying declarations" (see FED. R. EvID.
804(b)(2)). All of these exceptions arguably qualify as firmly rooted hearsay exceptions that
automatically satisfy the confrontation clause under Bourjaily v. United States. See supra text
accompanying notes 104-05; see also Kelly, 892 F.2d at 262 n.4 (discussing Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 66 n.8 (1980), which lists authority for several well-established hearsay
exceptions).
162. Kelly, 892 F.2d at 262.
163. Id. at 261.
164. Id. at 262.
165. Id. at 262-63. The Kelly case was decided some 18 months after United States v.
Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988), and relies on Salim as support for its holding that: (1)
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) is a firmly rooted hearsay exception and compliance with it automati-
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B. Statutory Challenges to Prosecution Depositions Taken Abroad
1. The Presence Requirement
In United States v. Kelly, defendant Kelly did not claim that his physical
absence from the Belgian depositions violated rule 15; however, Kelly's co-
defendant Gifford did make this argument.' 66 In a brief separate opinion in
United States v. Gifford, '67 the Third Circuit rejected the contention that the
prosecution's inability to present Gifford in Belgium, and the consequent
violation of rule 15(b)'s presence requirement, warranted reversal of Gif-
ford's conviction. 16  The court reasoned that, in light of the defendants'
telephonic participation in the proceeding, a strict reading of the presence
requirement would defeat the overall purpose of rule 15 to preserve essential
testimony in the interest of justice.' 69
2. Witness Unavailability
A number of other federal court decisions considering prosecution deposi-
tions taken abroad are instructive for their approach and their precedent on
an array of evidential and procedural issues likely to arise in any foreign rule
15 case. Several of these decisions focused on when a trial court may con-
sider a witness unavailable, a matter intrinsic to the application of rule 15.17
The issue of witness unavailability first arose in the Second Circuit's United
States v. Sindona 7' decision.
Sindona involved the testimony of four bank employees in Italy whose
statements supported charges of bank fraud against a financier.' 72 On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision to order the depo-
sitions.' 73 The court held that the trial court had discretion to accept the
cally satisfies the confrontation clause; and (2) restricted cross-examination procedures in for-
eign depositions may satisfy confrontation clause requirements. See id. at 262 n.6, 263.
166. Id. at 262 n.5.
167. 892 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3243 (1990).
168. Id. at 264-65.
169. Id.; see also Kelly, 892 F.2d at 262 n.5. Note that the Third Circuit's decision in
Gifford concerning rule 15(b)'s presence requirement issue also relies squarely on the Second
Circuit's decision of this issue in United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988). Gifford,
892 F.2d at 264-65.
170. See supra notes 46, 48, 57-58 and accompanying text.
171. 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981).
172. Id. at 802-03. The trial court found that the witnesses were not subject to subpoena
and were waffling on the eve of trial about whether they would attend. On this basis, the judge
ordered rule 15 depositions be taken pursuant to an international legal assistance treaty request
to Italian authorities. Id. The witnesses confirmed at their depositions that they were unwill-
ing to travel to the United States. When this fact was reported orally to the trial court, the
judge admitted the depositions over defense objections. Id. at 803.
173. Id.
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prosecutor's oral representations regarding a witness' prospective unavaila-
bility and need not require affidavits or other proof of unavailability in ruling
on a rule 15 motion before trial.' 7 4 The court also held that Roberts requires
only good faith efforts by the government to procure the witness' presence,
such as attempts to persuade witnesses to attend and offers to pay their ex-
penses, as a predicate to a finding of unavailability. 175 Finally, the court
held that a lower court's decision is not reversible absent a clear abuse of
discretion as to whether the circumstances supporting the government's rule
15 motion are sufficiently exceptional.1
76
One year after Sindona, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Steele, 1
77
held that Roberts required the government to establish at trial its good-faith
efforts to procure an unavailable witness as a prerequisite to admission of its
rule 15 deposition of that witness. 178 On an ancillary issue, the court held
that while rule 15 depositions are not to be used as discovery tools, 179 the
prosecution was permitted, when it was unable to gain access to a foreign
witness before a deposition, to make a lesser showing of the proposed deposi-
tion's materiality to the case than might otherwise be permitted on a rule 15
motion.'8 0 The Third Circuit also rebuffed the defendant's threshold argu-
ment that a court may not issue a treaty-based request for judicial assistance,
or a letter rogatory, to enable the government to take a rule 15 deposition
abroad. 18
In 1984, in United States v. Johnpoll, 82 the Second Circuit faced a new
twist to the witness unavailability question. In Johnpoll, prosecutors sought
the testimony of four Swiss business persons who were willing to testify at
the trial of an American investment banker, provided they were compen-
sated for travel expenses and time away from work, with one of them asking
in excess of $500 per day.'8 3 Prosecutors argued that the government was
authorized' 84 to compensate the witnesses at only $105 per day, and was
174. Id. at 804.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 685 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982).
178. Id. at 808.
179. Id. at 809; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Note on 1974
Amendment).
180. Steele, 685 F.2d at 809.
181. Id. at 808-09. The court observed that rule 15(d) directs that depositions be governed
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(3) directs "the taking
of depositions in foreign countries 'pursuant to a letter rogatory.'" Id. at 809.
182. 739 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1075 (1984).
183. Id. at 709. The banker faced charges stemming from the transport and sale of stolen
securities. Id. at 704.
184. The government was authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1984).
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prevented from negotiating directly with the witnesses under the terms of
the United States-Swiss mutual assistance treaty.' 85 The trial judge allowed
the depositions, which the defendant Johnpoll then refused to attend because
he faced an arrest warrant in Switzerland.'
8 6
On appeal of his conviction, Johnpoll argued that the prosecution's finan-
cial constraints did not qualify as exceptional circumstances warranting the
rule 15 depositions.' 87 Johnpoll also challenged the depositions as violating
his confrontation rights.' The Second Circuit found that the court had not
abused its discretion in finding exceptional circumstances.' 89 The court
noted that the deponents had not been amenable to compulsory process, that
their testimony was pivotal to Johnpoll's conviction, and that the payment of
witnesses' fees beyond established limits would set a harmful precedent that
would spawn both escalating demands from foreign witnesses and defense
charges that the United States was purchasing witness testimony.'1g The
court also held that witness unavailability had been adequately shown and
that Johnpoll had waived his confrontation clause challenge when he had
opted not to attend the depositions.' 9 '
In 1986, United States v. Kehm 92 provided yet another new twist to the
issue of witness unavailability. In Kehm, a rule 15 deposition that the de-
fense took in the Bahamas ultimately was offered by the government at trial
as inculpatory evidence. 9' On appeal of his conviction, the defendant ar-
gued that the prosecution's failure to make any effort to produce the witness,
who had refused to come to the trial, precluded a finding of unavailability
and thus rendered the deposition improperly admitted. 9' In response, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that, while
185. Johnpoll, 739 F.2d at 709 & n.9.
186. Id at 707-08. Prosecutors countered by securing the Swiss magistrate's agreement to
allow for full cross-examination by Johnpoll's retained Swiss counsel, and for an open phone
line for Johnpoll's use during the deposition. Id at 708. Ultimately, however, Johnpoll did
not monitor the depositions because his lawyers refused to attend after stating their opposition
to the proceedings. Id.
187. Id. at 708.
188. Id
189. Id. at 708-09.
190. Id at 709-10.
191. Id.
192. 799 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1986).
193. Id. at 359.
194. Id. at 360. The defendant, a drug smuggling lawyer, sought and was granted rule 15
authority to depose a witness in the Bahamas based on the witness' affidavit that he would not
appear at trial. Id. at 359. When the witness did not testify as expected, the defendant did not
offer his statement at trial. Id. After the defendant's conviction, he procured another affidavit
in which the witness asserted he was never unavailable to the government to testify. Id. On
appeal, the defendant based his argument on this second affidavit. Id. at 359-60.
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prosecutors are prohibited from omitting efforts to produce a witness just
because their chance of success is not certain, prosecutors are not obliged to
engage in pointless gestures.195 The court held that because no agreement
existed with the Bahamas to compel the witness to attend, and because the
witness was unlikely to have testified at trial particularly if compelled, prose-
cutors had no duty to pursue the witness after his first refusal to appear.
1 96
3. Fear of Prosecution Abroad
Implicit in the Second Circuit's holding in Johnpoll is the notion that a
defendant's fear of arrest when travelling abroad to a prosecution deposition,
whether warranted or not, is not cause to exempt a defendant from rule
15(b) or section 3503(b). These rules state that defendants who fail to ap-
pear at a deposition after notice waive their right to object at trial to the
taking of the deposition and its use in evidence. In 1985 in United States v.
Sines, 97 the Ninth Circuit echoed the Second Circuit's Johnpoll decision
regarding fear of foreign prosecution.1 9 In Sines, the defendant feared
arrest in Thailand on narcotics trafficking charges should he attend the dep-
osition of the prosecution's witness in that country. The prosecution witness
was imprisoned in Thailand after being caught trafficking illegal drugs for
the defendant.' 99 The court held that this "Hobson's choice" precluded
neither the taking of a rule 15 deposition nor waiver of defendants' rights to
object at trial when defendants opt not to attend.2" On a further question of
whether admission of the deposition at trial violated the defendant's con-
frontation right, the court asserted that the deposition testimony met the
Supreme Court's indicia of reliability test.20 1 Specifically, the court observed
that the deponent had testified under oath, that Sine's attorney had skillfully
cross-examined the deponent, and that the deposition was videotaped to per-
mit the jury to observe the deponent's demeanor.2 °2 The court stated that
these factors, rather than the trial court's perceptions of the inherent reliabil-
ity of the deponent, determine whether testimony bears sufficient indicia of
reliability.203
195. Id. at 360-61.
196. Id. at 361.
197. 761 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1985).
198. Id at 1441.
199. Id. at 1436, 1441.
200. Id. at 1441.
201. Id. at 1441-42.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1442.
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4. Oath and Affirmation
Federal courts have resolved several more procedural questions posed by
rule 15 depositions from abroad, including irregularities in administering an
oath or affirmation to deponents, as required by Federal Rule of Evidence
603.24 Such an issue was first decided in 1985 by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in United States v. Badala-
menti.o In Badalamenti, the court held that the failure of four prosecution
witnesses to take the oath during their deposition in Switzerland was not
fatal to the admission of their statements at trial.2" The court reasoned that
because the witnesses had asserted their veracity before the Swiss magistrate
conducting the depositions, these assertions satisfied federal evidence rules
on oath or affirmation.
2 0 7
The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion in 1989 in United States
v. Casamento.208 The Casamento court stated that the depositions at issue
were sufficiently reliable to be admitted because of the deponents' promises
to tell the truth and their respectful attitude toward the presiding Swiss
magistrate.2° 9
5. Deposition on Written Questions
A final rule 15 decision worthy of note is United States v. Trout,210 in
which the United States District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia considered the use of written depositions in criminal proceedings. In
Trout, the court granted a defense motion to take a rule 15 deposition upon
written questions from a witness in Brazil, a country which prohibits oral
204. FED. R. EvID. 603 states that "[b]efore testifying, every witness shall be required to
declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to
do so." FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c), which is implicitly incorporated by FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(d) to
govern deposition taking, provides in pertinent part that "[t]he officer before whom the deposi-
tion is to be taken shall put the witness on oath."
205. No. 84 Crim. 236 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1985) (WESTLAW, U.S. Dist. Ct. database).
206. Id.
207. Id. The court found that Swiss law prohibited swearing in the witnesses because they
were criminal defendants, and that the substitute affirmations satisfied the "oath or affirma-
tion" requirements of FED. R. EVID. 603 and FED. R. Civ. P. 30. Id.
208. 887 F.2d 1141, 1174-75 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990). For the
facts of Casamento, see supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
209. Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1175. In making this decision, the court relied on the Second
Circuit's decision 18 months earlier in United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988). See
Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1175. Salim in turn relied upon the district court's decision in United
States v. Badalamenti, No. 84 Crim. 236 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1985) (WESTLAW, U.S. Dist. Ct.
database), for its holding that a deponent's promise to a foreign judge to tell the truth when
testifying satisfied FED. R. EVID. 603. See Salim, 855 F.2d at 952.
210. 633 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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deposition of its citizens for use in American courts.2 1 The prosecution
objected to this motion on the grounds that deposition via written questions
would not afford the government adequate opportunity for cross-examina-
tion and would thus be inadmissible under rule 804(b)(1). 2 The court re-
jected this contention, pointing to rule 15's implicit incorporation of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 31(a), which allows for written depositions, and
concluded that the written cross-examination provided for there, albeit "less
robust" than oral questioning, was not sufficiently prejudicial to the prosecu-
tion to defeat the defense motion.
21 3
IV. UNITED STATES V SALIM" DECISIVE GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL
PROSECUTIONS BASED ON DEPOSITIONS FROM ABROAD
In United States v. Salim,2" 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit encountered foreign-imposed deposition procedures far more
divergent from American norms than courts had considered in any previous
rule 15 cases. Because the court nonetheless sanctioned these procedures,
they provide a benchmark for assessing the acceptability of all future foreign
depositions.
A. The Salim Facts: A Procedural Benchmark for Foreign Depositions
Knowledge of the circumstances that gave rise to the procedures used in
Salim is vital to understanding the outcome of the case. The rule 15 depo-
nent in Salim, Bebe Soraia Rouhani, was an illiterate mother of eight whom
police stopped, with her infant child, at a Paris airport. The woman was en
route from Pakistan to New York carrying nine pounds of heroin in her
false-bottom luggage.2"' Rouhani immediately described the defendant in
the case, Mohamid Salim, as the instigator of her drug trafficking.216
Rouhani's information enabled United States Customs Service agents at
Kennedy Airport to arrest Salim, after a chase, while he awaited Rouhani's
incoming flight.2" 7 In Salim's pockets, the Customs agents found a photo-
211. Id. at 151.
212. Id. at 152.
213. Id. The court also noted that the fruit of such written questioning might also be
admitted under residual rule 804(b)(5) if it bore the "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" called for by that rule. Id. at 153.
214. 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988).
215. Id. at 947; Brief for Appellee at 3, United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988)
(No. 87-1402).
216. Salim, 855 F.2d at 947.
217. Id.
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copy of Rouhani's passport.218 On the way to jail, Salim offered the agents
$20,000 to let him escape.219
American authorities detained Salim in New York pending trial.220
French authorities detained and prosecuted Rouhani, thereby preventing her
attendance at Salim's trial in federal court in New York.221 As a result, the
American trial judge222 granted the prosecution's rule 15 motion to depose
Rouhani in France, and prosecutors arranged this deposition with a French
court by letter rogatory.223
Salim could not attend Rouhani's deposition, however, because no treaty
existed empowering police to keep Salim in custody in France.224 The
French magistrate rejected the procedures suggested by prosecutors to over-
come Salim's absence, including the use of videotaping and open phone lines
inside the French courtroom, as contrary to French law.225 The French
magistrate also barred defense counsel from the courtroom during
Rouhani's deposition on the grounds that, without Salim present, the attor-
ney lacked standing in the proceeding. 226 To avoid preferential treatment,
the American prosecutor voluntarily absented himself.227 In addition, the
French magistrate required both parties to submit their questions in writing
because French law permitted only a judge to question a witness. 228 French
law also required that Rouhani be provided with the questions in advance.229
Finally, French law required the magistrate to keep a handwritten summary





222. The trial judge was the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, chief judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. His opinion in Salim is reported at 664 F. Supp.
682 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). Judge Weinstein was among the original drafters of the Federal Rules
of Evidence and served as a member of the Advisory Committee on the rules. See Preface to J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, COMMENTARY ON RULES OF Evi-
DENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES at vi-vii (1989).
223. Salim, 855 F.2d at 947.
224. Salim, 664 F. Supp. at 685.
225. Salim, 855 F.2d at 947.
226. Salim, 664 F. Supp. at 686. Judge Weinstein granted the prosecution's Rule 15 mo-
tion based on the assumption that both defense and government counsel would attend the
deposition. Id at 685.
227. Salim, 855 F.2d at 947.
228. Id.
229. Id. The prosecution submitted written questions to the magistrate in French and
English; the defense provided them only in English. Id
230. Id.
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court stenographer to attend the deposition only as an accommodation to
the American court.231
Through English and Farsi language translators, the stenographer re-
corded the questions and Rouhani's replies.2 32 Rouhani then left the court-
room, and the attorneys entered to hear the stenographer read back her
responses. 233 Defense counsel submitted follow-up queries, and the French
magistrate repeated the questioning procedure.234 Salim, accompanied by
an Urdu translator, was available by phone in New York throughout the
deposition, but his lawyer did not call for consultation on the questions and
responses.235 After two days, the magistrate recessed the deposition and the
parties returned to New York, where the stenographer prepared a transcript
of the proceeding, which defense counsel reviewed with Salim. 236 The prose-
cution and defense attorneys then returned to France for additional ques-
tioning, and this time defense counsel read Rouhani's responses to Salim by
phone. 237 The deposition resulted in a 145-page transcript, which the trial
judge redacted as needed after ruling on objections.238 Ultimately, Rouhani
answered all the questions posed by the American attorneys.239
At trial, the judge emphatically cautioned the jurors on the difficulties of
weighing the deponent's veracity given their inability to view her demeanor
firsthand. 2' The judge also instructed them that while Salim had a constitu-
tional right to confront Rouhani, this right was not violated although he did
not physically confront her.241 The judge's law clerks then read the redacted
transcript to the jury.242 Subsequently, the stenographer who had recorded
the deposition in France testified about the procedures used and the depo-
nent's distraught demeanor during the deposition. 243 The jury convicted
231. Id. at 948.
232. Id. at 947-48.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 948.
235. Id.
236. Id.; Brief for Appellee at 9, United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988) (No.
87-1402).
237. Salim, 855 F.2d at 948.
238. United States v. Salim, 664 F. Supp. 682, 686-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
239. Salim, 855 F.2d at 948. Both interpreters certified that their translations were verba-
tim. Id. at 953.
240. Id. at 948.
241. Salim, 664 F. Supp. at 686. Judge Weinstein also advised the jury on evaluating wit-
nesses with "a motive to curry favor" with the government. Id.
242. Id
243. Salim, 855 F.2d at 948. The stenographer testified that some conversations between
Rouhani and her lawyer, and several comments by the lawyer to the magistrate, were not
recorded because they were in French. Id. The latter were reported for the record from the
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Salim after four days of trial,2" and the judge sentenced him to 12 years in
prison.24 On appeal, Salim challenged both the taking and the admission of
Rouhani's deposition on grounds covering rule 15, rule 804(b)(1), and the
confrontation clause. 2'
B. The Salim Opinion: Applying the Rule of Necessity to Prosecution
Depositions Taken Abroad
1. The Court's Rule 15 Analysis
a The Presence Requirement
Salim challenged the prosecution's failure to present him at Rouhani's
deposition in France as a contravention of the presence requirement set forth
in rule 15(b).24 7 The Second Circuit acknowledged that existing case law
applied the presence requirement strictly in domestic settings. 248 The court
took into account the French court's refusal, however, to permit Salim's par-
ticipation in Rouhani's deposition by either videotape or telephone.249
Based on this refusal, the court chose to rely on Congress' more general
intent that rule 15 allow courts the discretion to preserve evidence in the
interests of justice.5 ° Reasoning that it was obliged to apply rule 15 to effec-
tuate this purpose, the Salim court juxtaposed the sovereign right of foreign
nations to refuse to acquiesce to American deposition procedures against the
prosecution's diligent efforts to gain such acquiescence. 25' On balance, the
court held that the foreign court's refusal to follow American rules of proce-
dure should not automatically and invariably prevent prosecution efforts to
gather evidence abroad.252 The court directed that prosecutors must at-
tempt to secure the defendant's physical presence at a foreign deposition
even via some form of live broadcast, if necessary. 2 3 Failing that, the court
magistrate's summary and reflected the few instances in which Rouhani exercised her right
under French law to answer through her attorney or not at all. Id.
244. Id.
245. See Mehler, supra note 31, at 2, col. 2.
246. Salim, 855 F.2d at 949.
247. Id.
248. Id. (citing United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979) as an example). In
Benfield, the trial court permitted the rule 15 deposition of a traumatized kidnap victim for use
against an accused accessory to the kidnapping while the accused watched by closed-circuit
monitor from another room; the witness was unaware that the accused was watching. Ben-
field, 593 F.2d at 817. The Eighth Circuit reversed the accused's conviction on confrontation
clause grounds. Id. at 821.
249. Salim, 855 F.2d at 949-50.
250. Id.
251. Id
252. Id. at 950.
253. Id.
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said that a deposition should be ordered, though the trial court should sat-
isfy itself that defense counsel will be given an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness commensurate with the accused's right under the confrontation
clause.254
As part of its analysis of the presence requirement, the Salim court relied
generally on the Supreme Court's decisions in Bourjaily v. United States255
and Coy v. Iowa 256 to support its holding that physical confrontation of
prosecution witnesses is not always constitutionally required, at least for out-
of-court statements.2 57 The Court pronounced this holding in one sentence,
without explanation or specific reference to supporting authority in Coy or
Bourjaily. This sentence comprised the extent of the Salim court's constitu-
tional assessment of the presence requirement.25
b. The "Manner" of the Deposition
Salim also challenged the manner of Rouhani's deposition as violative of
rule 15(d), which governs how depositions are to be taken.2 9 The court also
found this challenge, which focused on the circumstances of the deposition,
to be unavailing. 2" Specifically, Salim objected to Rouhani's deposition be-
cause the French magistrate had required all questions to be in writing and
because the presiding magistrate was a foreigner.261
To resolve this challenge, the court looked directly to the civil deposition
procedures incorporated by rule 15.262 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
31(a) allows for depositions by written questions. Based on this provision,
the court held that the defense attorney's inability to cross-examine orally,
while posing difficulties, did not contravene rule 15(d). 263 The court then
observed that the advisory committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
254. Id
255. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
256. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
257. Salim, 855 F.2d at 949.
258. Id; see infra text accompanying notes 328-32.
259. Salim, 855 F.2d at 950. Section (d), entitled "How Taken," instructs that "a deposi-
tion shall be taken... in the manner provided in civil actions... provided that ... the scope
and manner of examination and cross-examination shall be such as would be allowed in the
trial itself." FED. R. CalM. P. 15(d). The Court approached this challenge by first dissecting
the convoluted provision to identify what Salim was not asserting. Salim, 855 F.2d at 951. The
court found that Salim was not claiming that the questions posed at the deposition sought
irrelevant information, were improperly phrased, or elicited hearsay, opinion, or speculation
from the witness. Id. For this reason, the court held that Salim's challenge did not concern
the "scope and manner" of examination. Id.
260. Salim, 855 F.2d at 951-52.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 951.
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dure specifically contemplated that foreign depositions would be conducted
by foreign judges, and that foreign courts would follow their usual proce-
dures for taking testimony when executing a letter rogatory for judicial
assistance from a United States court. 6" The court also found that the
French magistrate fully complied with French procedure in taking
Rouhani's deposition. 65 Accordingly, the court held that defense counsel's
exclusion from the courtroom, as well as Rouhani's consultation with her
attorney before answering some deposition questions, did not contravene
rule 15.266
2. The Court's Rule 804(b)(1) Analysis
a Testimony as a Witness Under Oath or Affirmation
Salim challenged admission at trial of Rouhani's deposition on several evi-
dential grounds, 267 including the French magistrate's failure to place her
under oath.268 The court noted that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)
governs former testimony "given as a witness," and that witnesses are re-
quired, under evidence rule 603, to attest to their veracity by oath or
affirmation.269
Citing the district court's decision in United States v. Badalamenti,270 the
Salim court found that Rouhani's affirmation to the magistrate that she
would tell the truth was sufficient to satisfy rule 603.271 Alternatively, the
court supported its decision based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
28(b)'s specific instruction that deposition testimony taken pursuant to letter
rogatory need not be excluded merely because it is not taken under oath.27 2
b. Testimony Taken in Compliance with Law
The court also analyzed Salim's claims in light of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 804(b)(1)'s requirement that deposition testimony be "taken in com-
264. Id. at 951-52 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 28 advisory committee's note (1963)).
265. Id. at 952.
266. Id.
267. Salim did not contest, and it appears indisputable, that Rouhani was properly deemed
an unavailable declarant under evidence rule 804(a). See id. at 952. The prosecution at-
tempted to have her produced but the French court refused. United States v. Salim, 664 F.
Supp. 682, 686 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). This allowed the court to consider admitting her deposition
under 804(b)(1). Id.
268. Salim, 855 F.2d at 952.
269. Id. at 953; see supra note 204.
270. No. 84 Crim. 236, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1985) (WESTLAW, U.S. Dist. Ct.
database).
271. Salim, 855 F.2d at 952.
272. Id.
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pliance with law." '273 In Salim, this evidentiary requirement directed the
court back to rule 15 on criminal depositions, which in turn led the court,
via rule 15(d), back to the broad provisions of civil procedure rules 28 and
31"274 From this melee of rules, the court distilled the following direction:
That a deposition taken abroad under foreign law but in conformity with the
civil deposition rules is in compliance with law for purposes of the former
testimony exception.275
Such an accepting view of foreign deposition procedures, the court rea-
soned, was supported by general principles of international comity.
2 76
Those principles of comity, the court asserted, require American courts to
show due respect for foreign procedures except in those cases where the pro-
cedures are so unfair or prone to bias or inaccuracy as to render testimony
inherently unreliable.2 77 The French judicial system, the court noted, while
different from the American, is equally interested in both impartiality and in
obtaining accurate testimony.278 Accordingly, the court held that Rouhani's
deposition had been taken in compliance with law.279
c. Opportunity to Develop Testimony by Cross-Examination
Not surprisingly, the thrust of Salim's challenge under rule 804(b)(1) con-
cerned the conditions under which his attorney conducted cross-examina-
tion.28 ° The court rejected Salim's assertions that his attorney was denied
adequate opportunity for cross-examination because he could not view the
witness' demeanor and could not develop a spontaneous line of
questioning.281
In considering Salim's claim, the court readily acknowledged that the
need for written questions made the defense counsel's task more difficult.
28 2
Nonetheless, relying on Ohio v. Roberts2 3 and its progeny, the Salim court
found that Rouhani's questioning constituted cross-examination as a matter
273. Id. at 953. The requirement is so written because the rule is designed to govern both
civil and criminal proceedings. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1), supra note 57.
274. Salim, 855 F.2d at 953.
275. Id.
276. Id. The court noted the recent direction by the Supreme Court that "'any sovereign
interest expressed by a foreign state' " warrants respect "so long as that interest is compatible
with our own sovereign interests." Id. (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 543-44 nn.27-28, 546 (1987)).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 952.




283. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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of form because it was replete with leading questions, the primary tool of
cross-examination. 284 The court further found that defense counsel's re-
peated opportunities to pose follow-up questions after reviewing Rouhani's
earlier responses cured the lack of spontaneity.285 In addition, the court
noted Salim's availability to his lawyer by telephone throughout the proceed-
ing, and the defense's uncommon opportunity during the week-long recess to
analyze the transcript in detail for misstatements or inaccuracies. 28 6 Over-
all, the court held, these opportunities compensated amply for both Salim's
absence from the hearing and the strictures imposed by French law.287
3. The Court's Confrontation Clause Analysis
Having examined the elements of rule 804(b)(1), the court turned to the
Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts for its general approach to as-
sessing hearsay under the confrontation clause.28 In applying the Roberts
approach, the court found several indicia of reliability in the circumstances
surrounding Rouhani's deposition. 2 9 These indicia included Rouhani's af-
firmation to tell the truth, defense counsel's opportunity for cross-examina-
tion, and the control exercised by a judicial authority over the conduct of
judicial proceedings.29°
In obvious reference to the Supreme Court's opinion in California v.
Green,291 the court characterized the indicia it had identified as illustrative
of the classic reliability indicia that allay a court's concerns about the ab-
sence at trial of a hearsay declarant.292 The court then advanced a further
indication of reliability warranting use of Rouhani's deposition: the court
found that Rouhani's testimony was corroborated on certain points by other
evidence introduced at trial.293 While the court did not elaborate on the
details of this corroborating evidence, such evidence included Salim's flight
from customs officials at the airport, his offer of a bribe while en route to jail,
and, particularly, his possession of a copy of Rouhani's passport while wait-
ing for her plane.294 Guided by these factors, the court concluded that no
284. Salim, 855 F.2d at 954 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1980)); see supra
note 88 and accompanying text.
285. Salim, 855 F.2d at 954.
286. Id.
287. Id
288. Id. at 954-55.
289. Id. at 955.
290. Id.
291. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
292. Salim, 855 F.2d at 955.
293. Id.
294. See id. at 947.
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constitutional infirmity existed in the lower court's admission of Rouhani's
former testimony at Salim's trial.2 95
V. THE SALIM APPROACH: A BELLWETHER IN A SHRINKING WORLD
The Second Circuit's resolution of Salim's challenges appears to turn on
three factors interwoven throughout the case: (1) the necessity and impor-
tance of obtaining Rouhani's testimony, without which the prosecution
could not have convicted Salim on the primary conspiracy charge;296 (2) the
prosecution's diligent efforts to arrange a deposition employing the full com-
plement of American procedures; and (3) the French magistrate's compli-
ance with French law in imposing the deposition procedures actually used.
These factors seemed to motivate the court's willingness to stretch the usual
dimensions of rules 15 and 804(b)(1) regarding the necessity of an oath and
the form and quality of cross-examination. These factors also seem to con-
tribute to the court's decision to dispense with rule 15's presence require-
ment when the prosecution's reach for essential evidence exceeded its legal
authority to keep Salim in custody. Finally, these factors appear to spur the
court's use of the confrontation clause's "rule of necessity ' 297 to dispense
with face-to-face confrontation and to temper the need for strong similarities
between the deposition proceeding and the trial, from which former testi-
mony hearsay derives a measure of its reliability. Overall, with obvious re-
gard for the extreme nature of the facts before it, the Salim court concluded
that despite considerable concern about possible abuses of foreign methods
of examining witnesses, it was not persuaded by the challenges presented in
Salim's case.298
The Salim Court began its opinion with the admonition that judicial as-
sessments of unconventional foreign examination methods are best con-
ducted case-by-case.299 Whatever disclaimer this statement may intend, the
Salim decision pointedly determined a series of procedural, evidential and
constitutional issues that form the gamut of pitfalls confronting prosecutors
pursuing oral evidence from abroad. In making these decisions, the Salim
court pioneered a juridical trail already followed by the United States Court
295. Id. at 955.
296. Salim was charged with, and convicted of, conspiracy to distribute, and to possess
with intent to distribute heroin (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i), 846 (1988)) and of offering a
bribe to a U.S. Customs agent (18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 3623 (1988)). See United States v. Salim,
664 F. Supp. 682, 684 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). The district court stated that the prosecution had
made a "showing of the critical nature of [Rouhani's] testimony." Id. at 685.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
298. Salim, 855 F.2d at 950.
299. Id. at 946.
[Vol. 39:895
United States v. Salim
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in its Gifford and Kelly decisions 3°° and one
that other courts will certainly heed. Analysis of the Salim court's proce-
dural, evidential, and constitutional determinations reveals that each is sup-
ported by Supreme Court precedent, by congressional intent, and by
practical considerations of fairness and justice.
A. The Rule 15 Disposition
1. Reading the Presence Requirement Out of Rule 15
By far the most controversial choice the Salim court made was its decision
to construe as nonbinding the unequivocal requirement in rule 15(b) that
prosecutors produce in-custody defendants at depositions and keep them in
the presence of the witness throughout the examination.3 0' Such judicial
finesse is troubling, and it will likely be anathema to strict statutory con-
structionists. The presence requirement of rule 15 stands explicit and sepa-
rate from the provisions governing the taking and use of deposition
testimony contained in sections (d) and (e) of the rule.
Nevertheless, the Federal Rules of Evidence subsumed by rule 15 do not
require a face-to-face encounter as a prerequisite to the admission of deposi-
tion testimony.302 Further, the legislative history of the evidence rules indi-
cates that they were not intended to require physical confrontation.
30 3 Civil
procedure rule 31, also employed by rule 15, permits either party to take
depositions on written questions, potentially affording no physical confronta-
tion. The focus of both the evidence and civil procedure rules is cross-exam-
ination. Thus, by incorporating these rules, rule 15 poses an internal
contradiction by imposing a condition on the deposition - the defendant's
physical presence - that is otherwise required neither for a deposition's tak-
ing nor for its admission at trial.
Viewed in this light, rule 15's presence requirement functions as an extra-
neous pretrial procedural appendage. °4 The Salim court recognized the
presence requirement's ultimate irrelevancy, as shown by the court's holding
that the testing of the deposition under the confrontation clause and under
the evidence rules are independent inquiries best addressed separately at
trial.30 5 Because Federal Rule of Evidence 804 and the confrontation clause
are the intended standards for measuring the admissibility of former testi-
300. See supra notes 165, 169.
301. Salim, 855 F.2d at 949-50.
302. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
303. Id.
304. Rule 15 is a pretrial provision categorized under "Arraignment and Preparation for
Trial" in the federal criminal rules. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
305. Salim, 855 F.2d at 950.
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mony, the Salim court's distinction between preservation of testimony and
its eventual admission seems appropriate.
Whether a court may properly construe a pre-trial provision such as the
presence requirement to eliminate its application is another question. Ar-
guably, rule 15's presence requirement should be applied no more absolutely
than the constitutional right to physically confront all those who give evi-
dence at trial. Coy v. Iowa states that this constitutional right may be waiv-
able when necessary to further an important public policy. 3" Even as a
purely statutory matter, however, the need to gather pivotal testimony
abroad provides an overarching reason for waiving the presence requirement
when factors beyond the government's control preclude it from transporting
the defendant. These factors include the prosecution's domestic-bound juris-
diction to detain in-custody defendants or the host nation's refusal to allow
the defendant to appear. In particular, such legal barriers to presenting the
defendant at a foreign deposition, which, in essence, render the defendant
legally unavailable for physical confrontation, provide a sound basis for
waiving a condition imposed by pre-trial rule 15. The Salim court did not
waive the presence requirement lightly, but did so only in the face of exigent
factors wholly beyond the prosecution's control.
Finally, the Salim court's directive that prosecutors must attempt to se-
cure the defendant's presence at the foreign deposition in some form, includ-
ing live broadcast, indicates the court's awareness, and perhaps hope, that
television technology may eventually obviate the problem of face-to-face
confrontation over vast distances. Considering, however, that such technol-
ogy is likely to remain beyond the reach of most federal courts for some
time, the Salim court's choice to waive the presence requirement is a prag-
matic compromise.
2. Focusing on Preservation of Testimony as the Crux of Rule 15
The Salim court employed the same graduated analysis it had applied to
the presence requirement in making its determination that the circumstances
of Rouhani's deposition did not contravene the requirements of rule 15(d).
Specifically, the court observed that rule 15's primary concentration is on
preservation of testimony and that admissibility of hearsay is a secondary
concern. The court reasoned that because American judges cannot always
know in advance what procedures a foreign court actually will impose,
judges should permit the parties to take depositions and consider any proce-
dural problems after they can examine the transcript and the circumstances
306. See supra notes 113, 117-19 and accompanying text.
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under which the deposition was conducted.3°7 The Salim court's view seems
wholly consistent with the intentions of the advisory committee on rule 15.
The committee directed courts to decide whether to order a rule 15 deposi-
tion based on the particular circumstances of each case.3°s The advisory
committee further instructed that preservation of evidence for use at trial
was the principal objective in drafting rule 15. 3 ' The committee's choice of
the phrase "use at trial" does not seem intended to mean admission at trial,
but rather consideration for admission. This intent is apparent from the
committee's admonition that a deposition, once taken, is not automatically
admissible, but may be used only if it is otherwise admissible under the rules
of evidence, specifically rule 804(b)(1).31° In short, rule 15 was not intended
to replace evidence rule 804.
B. The Rule 804(b)(1) Disposition
1. Paying Due Deference to Foreign Law
The Salim court's determination that depositions taken abroad in con-
formity with both foreign law and American civil procedure rules satisfy
rule 804(b)(1), the hearsay exception for former testimony, cuts a broad
swath for future international prosecutions. However, the court's wide-
ranging viewpoint correctly places the ambit of the American justice system
in necessary perspective. The Salim court recognized that America has no
monopoly on fairness under law, while remaining mindful of basic sixth
amendment protections. As the trial judge in Salim noted, " '[t]he French
administration of justice, far more than the Anglo-American, has become a
model abroad.' ,311 Other model systems have emanated from nations as
diverse as Austria and Japan. Such systems govern a major portion of the
globe. In an era in which the scope of crime far exceeds the reach of work-
ing United States treaty arrangements with other nations, a measured reli-
ance on the integrity of foreign judicial systems seems a temperate
compromise, particularly when American counsel are permitted active par-
ticipation in the foreign proceedings.
307. See Salim, 855 F.2d at 950.
308. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note (Note on 1974 Amendment).
309. Id
310. Id. (Note of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-247). Elsewhere, the
advisory committee noted that "factors which determine the use of the deposition" include the
likely future unavailability of the witness, the possibility that the witness will be coerced before
trial, and the agreement of the parties that the deposition should be used. Id. (Note on 1974
Amendment).
311. United States v. Salim, 664 F. Supp. 682, 688 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting H. AntRA-
HAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, ENGLAND AND FRANCE 254-69 (1975)).
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2. Taking the Broad View of Cross-Examination
The Salim court recognized that the Supreme Court has defined the requi-
site opportunity for cross-examination afforded to defendants by Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) in terms of the constitutional right to confronta-
tion.312 In holding that the cross-examination afforded to Salim's lawyer
was constitutionally adequate, the Salim court relied on the principle forged
in Ohio v. Roberts, and further developed in subsequent Supreme Court
cases, 313 that the confrontation clause generally is satisfied when the defense
is given a full and fair opportunity to probe testimony through cross-exami-
nation, regardless of the results.31 4 One may argue that none of these
Supreme Court cases contemplated cross-examination based on written
questions in criminal proceedings and that this method quells a key element
of spontaneity in such proceedings. In addition, the Supreme Court has yet
to address the propriety of a foreign judge conducting such questioning.315
The Salim court appears correct, however, in holding that defense counsel
was accorded essentially a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine under
the terms of the sixth amendment as defined by the Supreme Court.31 6
Salim's attorney extensively probed Rouhani's testimony, and any reasons
312. United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 953-54 (2d Cir. 1988).
313. Id. at 954 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1980)); see supra notes 94-96 and
accompanying text.
314. In addition to Roberts, the court relies specifically on Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S.
15, 20, 22 (1985) (per curiam). See Salim, 855 F.2d at 953-54. Fensterer involved an FBI
expert witness who opined at trial that a cat leash offered as a murder weapon bore hairs
apparently torn from the victim's head. On cross-examination, however, the witness could not
recall specifically which means he had used previously to reach this conclusion. Fensterer, 474
U.S. at 16-17. The Court summarily held that the expert's lack of recall did not preclude
adequate confrontation. Id. at 18.
Fensterer then held that "the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is
given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose... infirmities [in testimony] through
cross-examination." Id. at 22. The objective of this opportunity is to "call to the attention of
the factfinder the reasons for giving [the testimony] scant weight." Id. The Court held, how-
ever, that the confrontation clause guarantees only an opportunity to cross-examine, "not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might
wish." Id. at 20. The Supreme Court relied on its holding in Roberts, 488 U.S. at 73 n. 12, that
no inquiry into the effectiveness of cross-examination is required by the confrontation clause,
even when the opportunity for cross-examination occurs only at a preliminary hearing.
These views have been fully reaffirmed in two cases since Fensterer: United States v. Owens,
484 U.S. 554 (1988) and Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
315. Salim, 664 F. Supp. at 691.
316. Salim, 855 F.2d at 954. On the issue of the written questions, the Salim court drew a
somewhat weak analogy to a situation resolved by Ohio v. Roberts. Id. In Roberts, defense
counsel's direct examination of a defense witness at a pretrial hearing was held to constitute
cross-examination as "a matter of form" because it "was replete with leading questions." Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. at 70-71 (emphasis omitted); see supra text accompanying note 88. The counsel
in Roberts, however, posed the questions himself orally, not in writing from outside the room
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that emerged for giving it scant weight were presented to the jury through
the transcript at trial. Moreover, while Salim's attorney was absent from the
French courtroom, his questions were put to Rouhani by a judge motivated
by a duty to assess Rouhani's own criminal culpability. The Salim court
noted that the jury could discern Rouhani's veracity in part from the tran-
script itself and, further, from the court reporter's comments about her
demeanor.317
C. The Confrontation Clause Disposition
1. Applying Ohio v. Roberts' "General Approach" to Foreign
Depositions
The Salim court identified four independent indications that Rouhani's
deposition testimony was reliable inculpatory evidence: (1) it was taken
under affirmation; (2) subject to cross-examination; (3) in a proceeding
before a judge; and (4) corroborated by other facts in the case.31" Under
Ohio v. Roberts, these factors appear to be more than sufficient to support the
court's holding that admission of Rouhani's deposition did not violate
Salim's sixth amendment right. In particular, the independent corrobora-
tion compels a finding that Rouhani's testimony bore guarantees of trust-
worthiness sufficient to justify its presentation to the jury, despite the jury's
inability to scrutinize her demeanor at trial.
2 Misunderstanding Bourjaily v. United States
Apart from this fact-based finding of constitutionality, however, the Salim
court made a disturbing legal deduction. The court determined that when
former testimony, such as Rouhani's deposition, qualifies for admission
under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), Supreme Court case law, and
specifically Bourjaily v. United States, instructs that this testimony automati-
cally satisfies the confrontation clause.3 19 The court based this assertion on
the theory that the former testimony exception is one of the most firmly
rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule.32° No doubt this is true as a general
proposition. But as ah-eady shown, the exception's firm roots do not appear
to reach to the expansive deposition provision of rule 804(b)(1).
32 1
through a foreign judge. Nonetheless, no question existed as to defense counsel's intent to
cross-examine Rouhani.
317. Salim, 855 F.2d at 954.
318. Id. at 955.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 954-55.
321. See supra note 54 and text accompanying notes 54-58.
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To date, the Supreme Court has not expressly stated whether the hearsay
exception for former testimony, including the deposition provision of
804(b)(1), is firmly rooted enough to warrant dispensing with an independ-
ent inquiry into the testimony's reliability. As noted, the Boujaily decision
determined only that the hearsay exception for co-conspirators' statements
deserved firmly rooted status.32 2 The Roberts Court indicated that the for-
mer testimony exception is firmly rooted to the extent that it allows into
evidence prior trial testimony by a witness who was cross-examined.323 The
conclusion follows that admission of a past trial's transcript would not gen-
erally require a separate reliability test. Given the Inadi Court's assessment
that the reliability of former testimony derives partially from the strong sim-
ilarities between the prior judicial proceeding and the trial, however, it seems
antithetical not to require at trial some showing that a rule 15 deposition, or
a preliminary hearing, fostered, at least procedurally, a reliable accounting
by the witness. The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Green pro-
vides guidelines for making such a showing of reliability. Specifically, in
Green, the Supreme Court expressed concern that the declarant was under
oath, that the defendant had counsel with ample opportunity to cross-ex-
amine, and that the hearing was conducted before a judicial tribunal
equipped to record the proceeding. 324 Thus, considering Green, Roberts,
and Inadi in tandem, and remembering rule 804(b)(1)'s express requirement
that a defendant have the opportunity and similar motive to develop testi-
mony through questioning, it seems apparent that a prosecutor proffering
rule 15 evidence can fairly expect some independent inquiry into the reliabil-
ity of the deposition.
3 25
322. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
323. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 & n.8. (1980) (stating "that certain hearsay
exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within
them comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection'" (quoting Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)), and citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16
(1972), for its holding on "cross-examined prior-trial testimony" (and also including the hear-
say exceptions for dying declarations and business and public records)); see also C. FISHMAN &
L. BARRACATO, supra note 93, at 5-103.
324. See supra text accompanying note 83.
325. Before and since Roberts, several federal circuit courts have concluded that grand jury
testimony, even though completely untested by cross-examination, may be admissible if it is
sufficiently corroborated by "circumstantial evidence supporting its veracity." United States v.
Feldman, 761 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1985); see also United States ex rel. Haywood v. Wolff,
658 F.2d 455, 462-63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1088 (1981); United States v. West, 574
F.2d 1131, 1136-37 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936 (1978).
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that, although grand jury testimony falls outside rule
804(b)(1) because it lacks cross-examination, it may nonetheless be admissible under the
residual hearsay exception of rule 804(b)(5) if it bears "circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
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The need for such an inquiry is further indicated by the restrictive com-
mon-law approach to the use of depositions at criminal trials, which permit-
ted depositions to be read at trial only when the deponent was dead, insane,
too sick to attend, or absent by connivance of the defendant, and only when
the deposition was taken in the presence of the defendant. 26 Bouraily im-
plies that the scope of a hearsay exception's common law antecedent should
weigh heavily in assessing whether the exception is firmly rooted.32" '
3. Glossing Over the Defendant's Right to Face-to-Face Confrontation
Of final concern is the Salim court's failure to address directly in its con-
stitutional analysis the fact that Salim was denied face-to-face confrontation
with Rouhani at both the deposition and the trial. As noted, the Salim court
relied, without elaboration, on the Bourjaily and Coy decisions in holding
that physical confrontation of prosecution witnesses is not always constitu-
tionally required, at least for out-of-court statements.32 Bourjaily, however,
involved strictly the hearsay exception for co-conspirators' statements,
which are admissible as substantive evidence regardless of the declarant's
availability for confrontation.329 Coy dealt strictly with face-to-face confron-
tation of non-hearsay witnesses present at trial.330 Neither Supreme Court
case addressed the issue before the court in Salim: whether an accused bears
thiness" equivalent to those of cross-examined former testimony or the other three categories
of statements covered by rule 804(b): dying declarations (FED. R. EViD. 804(b)(2)); state-
ments against interest (FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)); and statements of personal or family history
(FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4)). United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir. 1989).
The Court noted that grand jury testimony, because of the circumstances under which it is
taken, would need to be "extraordinarily trustworthy" to warrant admission. Still, it declined
to adopt a per se ban simply because such testimony fell within the rubric of, but did not
satisfy, rule 804(b)(1) specifically. Id. at 981-82.
326. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258,
262 (1904)). These common-law conditions are akin both to the guidelines enumerated in
Green, and to the requirements of rule 804(b)(1) and rule 15 for admission of deposition testi-
mony. Both Green and the rules indicate that the circumstances of a criminal deposition must
be accounted for when the deposition is proffered at trial.
Note that the House Judiciary Committee's 1970 report on the then-proposed rule 15 incor-
porated the United States Justice Department's view that "[t]he grounds for use of depositions
in criminal cases as codified in Rule 15(e) are essentially those which were recognized at com-
mon law." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4061. This view is stated in a letter dated July 23, 1970, from
Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, to House Judiciary Committee
Chairman Emanuel Celler, which Celler appended to the House report. The letter cites as
authority West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
327. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 257-58.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
330. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
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a right to physically confront, as opposed to simply cross-examine through
defense counsel, an accuser testifying at a formal pretrial hearing when the
testimony is intended for use at subsequent trial.33 The Coy decision, while
holding open the promise that face-to-face encounter may be waived in mat-
ters of sufficient public importance, is clearly inclined toward a literal appli-
cation of this right to face-to-face confrontation.332 While the legal
constraint on detaining American defendants abroad provides excellent
grounds for waiving such a right, the issue of its existence and amenability to
waiver remains ripe for a thoroughgoing constitutional discussion.
VI. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Salim, the Second Circuit charts new territory in sev-
eral areas of federal criminal law affecting the acquisition and use of inculpa-
tory testimony from witnesses located outside the United States. First, and
perhaps of most importance for the short term, the Salim decision directs
trial courts to order depositions abroad pursuant to Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 15 based on the reasonable efforts of prosecutors to ensure the
use of American deposition procedures. Second, when reasonable efforts
fail, Salim directs that deposition-taking should proceed under any foreign-
imposed circumstances the court believes ultimately will not violate the con-
frontation clause if the evidence is offered at trial. Third, Salim provides
that a foreign court's use of deposition procedures divergent from American
methods should not form a per se bar to the deposition's admission at trial,
provided that the procedures used comply with the host court's law and do
not thwart basic fairness or lack inherent reliability. This openness to for-
eign procedures includes those procedures requiring the deposition to be
conducted via written questions with defense counsel absent from the room.
Finally, and most strikingly, Salim provides that the defendant's absence
from a deposition due to the lack of legal authority to detain him abroad is
not fatal to the deposition's admission under either rule 15 or the confronta-
tion clause.
Because of these views, Salim seems certain to define future debate on the
government's burgeoning efforts to secure pivotal testimony from witnesses
located beyond United States borders. As the decision indicates, develop-
ment of technology in simultaneous broadcasting will assist in bridging these
borders, thereby easing the need for constitutional compromise in the inter-
ests of criminal justice. Adoption of additional international mutual assist-
ance treaties, which provide for joint custody and lend to foreign acceptance
331. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
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of American procedures, will do the same. In the meantime, United States v.
Salim lends its well-reasoned guidance to the judicial fray.
Michael J. Burke

